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NOTE
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HIV/AIDS DRUGS:
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
MULTINATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL
CORPORATIONS
Lissett Ferreira*
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations has characterized the impact of the HIV/AIDS
crisis in Africa as "no less destructive than that of warfare itself."1 In
developed nations, the widespread availability of life-prolonging
HIV/AIDS drugs has turned AIDS from a death sentence into a
manageable and treatable illness.2 But in developing countries, which
account for ninety percent of infected people globally, the
overwhelming majority of HIV/AIDS sufferers cannot afford these
life-saving treatments.' In South Africa, where the average daily
J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Press Release, United Nations, In Address to Security Council, Secretary-
General Says Fight Against AIDS in Africa Immediate Priority in Global Effort
Against Disease, SG/SM/7275 AFR/200 SC/6780 (Jan. 6, 2000) (statement of U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/
20000106.sgsm7275.doc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). As of December 2001, an estimated 28.1 million people in sub-Saharan
Africa alone were infected with HIV. Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS & WHO, AIDS Epidemic Update at 2, 3, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/01.74E,
WHO/CDS/CSR/NCS/2001.2 (2001), available at http://www.unaids.org/worldaids
day/2001/Epiupdate200l/EPIupdate200_len.pdf [hereinafter UNAIDS Update].
2. See James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to
Low-End Consumers, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 727, 733-34 (2001) (stating that "drug treatment
has quadrupled the median survival time for Americans diagnosed with AIDS from
one to four years" and decreased mortality rates by seventy-five percent); Judy Rein,
International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential
Medicines, 21 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 379, 379 (2001) ("Significant public and private
investment, particularly in the United States, converted this killer into a manageable
chronic disorder for many in the developed world.").
3. See UNICEF et al., Sources and Prices of Selected Drugs and Diagnostics for
People Living with HIV/AIDS 5 (2001), available at http://www.unaids.org/
acc-access/access-drugs/Sources05Ol.doc [hereinafter Sources & Prices]; Rein, supra
note 2, at 379. In sub-Saharan Africa, where approximately seventy-five percent of
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income is $7, a one-year supply of the most common HIV treatment
combination from the major drug companies costs a staggering $1200. 4
The generic equivalent of that same drug combination costs $350 per
year.5
Developing countries and human rights activists claim that these
prohibitively expensive drug prices are the result of strong patent
protection, which governments must provide under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).6
While TRIPS is mostly favorable to the rich industrialized world and
its multinational corporations,' it provides some flexibility for states to
address their public health needs by allowing several public interest
exceptions to patent protection. s Through the use of controversial
people live on less than two dollars a day, UNAIDS Update, supra note 1, at 7, only
an estimated 10,000-25,000 Africans are receiving anti-retroviral treatment, Sources &
Prices, supra, at 5. See also Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death:
As Millions Perished in Pandemic, Firms Debated Access to Drugs, Wash. Post, Dec.
27, 2000, at Al (stating that only "one-tenth of 1 percent" of infected Africans receive
HIV/AIDS drug therapy).
4. AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, CNN.com, Apr. 18, 2001, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/WORLD/africa/04/18/safrica.drugs.02/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review); Kristen Philipkoski, S. Africa To Rule on AIDS
Drugs, Wired News, Apr. 14, 2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,
43066,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
HIV drug combinations, known as drug cocktails, "interrupt the cycle of HIV
infection, allow an infected person's immune system to rebuild itself, and allow the
person to live much longer than the person would without treatment." Gathii, supra
note 2, at 734.
5. AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, supra note 4.
6. See Kara M. Bombach, Note, Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling the
South African Medicines and Related Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement, 19
B.U. Int'l L.J. 273, 288 (2001) ("Some critics argue that, because TRIPS provides for
worldwide patent protection, drugs become more expensive in developing
countries."); Andrew Pollack, Defensive Drug Industry: Fueling Clash Over Patents,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 2001, at A6 ("Drug patents are under attack, blamed for high
AIDS drug prices that deny life-saving therapy to millions of people in developing
countries."); Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Health Care
in the Developing World: The Global Challenge of AIDS, at
http://world.phrma.org/global.challenge.aids.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter PhRMA Global Challenge]; see also
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. TRIPS provides an
international framework of intellectual property obligations that is binding on World
Trade Organization (WTO) member states. See infra Part I.A.3 for a thorough
discussion of TRIPS.
7. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 761 ("Substantively, TRIPS came to embody the
interests of the ... Western coalition."); Pollack, supra note 6 (quoting the president
of a generic drug companies' trade organization characterizing TRIPS as "probably
the greatest political economic achievement that the pharmaceutical industry ever
had").
8. See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 2, at 759-70 (discussing the public interest logic of
TRIPS); Rein, supra note 2, at 387 (discussing TRIPS and the North American Free
Trade Agreement and noting that "the intellectual property provisions of the trade
2002] ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HIV/AIDS DRUGS 1135
practices such as compulsory licensing and parallel importing, drug
prices in developing countries feasibly could be reduced by ninety
percent.'
Along with other developing nations, South Africa has attempted to
take advantage of this flexibility by adopting a law designed to reduce
the prices of HIV/AIDS drugs."° Thus, in 1997, the South African
Parliament proposed an amendment to its existing Medicines and
Related Substances Control Act ("Medicines Act Amendment") to
allow the government to take measures to ensure wider access to
essential drugs.1 The multinational drug companies, in tandem with
the U.S. government, however, have aggressively opposed such
legislation, characterizing it as an infringement on their intellectual
property rights by allowing practices such as parallel importing and
compulsory licensing. 2 In South Africa, for example, subsidiaries of
agreements leave substantial room for countries to exercise regulatory control over
pharmaceutical pricing").
9. Joint Press Release, M~decins Sans Fronti&res et al., Generic AIDS Drugs
Offer New Lease of Life to South Africans; Importation of Generics Cuts Price in
Half (Jan. 29, 2002) ("Our project shows that antiretroviral therapy is feasible in a
resource-poor setting."), at http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm (last visited Nov. 9,
2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Generic Drugs Press
Release]; see also AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, supra note 4 (citing Mddecins Sans
Frontires estimate that the price of one HIV/AIDS drug cocktail in South Africa
could be reduced by three-quarters if it were purchased from a generic producer).
10. See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment, Act 90 of 1997
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.Policy.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1997/act90.pdf
[hereinafter Medicines Act Amendment]; see also Joanne Csete, Several for the Price
of One: Right to AIDS Treatment as Link to Other Human Rights, 17 Conn. J. Int'l L.
263, 264 (2002) (describing Kenya's law); Duane Nash, South Africa's Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 485
(2000) (discussing South Africa's amendment); Rosemary Sweeney, Comment, The
U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in
Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol'y J. 445 (2000) (discussing
Thailand's statute).
11. See Naomi A. Bass, Note, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for
Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the
21st Century, 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 191, 210 (2002).
12. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. Int'l
L.J. 481, 500-02 (2002) (describing U.S. pressure on South Africa and Thailand, on
behalf of the drug industry, to prevent the implementation of laws to make
HIV/AIDS drugs cheaper); Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access to
Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African
Example, 7 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 137, 151 (2001) (discussing responses of U.S.
interests to South Africa's law); Submission of PhRMA for the "Special 301" Report
on Intellectual Property Barriers (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America 2002) (requesting that the United States take action against countries such
as South Africa and Brazil), http://www.phrma.org/international/special301 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also Barbara Larkin,
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal,
Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(c) of the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Act of 1965 (Feb. 5, 1999) (detailing U.S. government's actions to
"defend the legitimate interests and rights of U.S. pharmaceutical firms" in South
Africa), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html (last visited Nov. 5,
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the major multinational drug companies filed a lawsuit to prevent
implementation of the amended law. 13 While the drug industry and its
supporters have defended the intellectual property rights of drug
companies, others have framed access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs
as a human rights issue. During the controversy in South Africa, for
example, human rights organizations and commentators accused the
drug companies of violating human rights. 5
Part I of this Note presents the background to the debate over laws
designed to increase access to drugs, focusing on intellectual property
rights, and contextualizes the debate through the South African
experience. Section A presents the intellectual property rights issues
raised by governments' efforts to make HIV/AIDS drugs more
affordable.' 7 This section presents the debate over patents and the
practices that undermine them, as well as the debate over the TRIPS
provisions relevant to HIV/AIDS drugs access. 8  Section B
contextualizes this debate by focusing on the Medicines Act
Amendment and the drug companies' aggressive opposition to that
law.'9
Part II explores the human rights dimension to HIV/AIDS drugs
2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Larkin Report]. See infra
Part I.B and accompanying notes for a discussion of the drug industry's opposition to
South Africa's amended law and similar laws.
13. See Applicants' Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs.' Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President
of the Republic of South Africa, the Honourable Mr. N.R. Mandela N.O. (S. Afr.
1998) (No. 4183/98), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Notice of Motion];
see also Nash, supra note 10, at 486-87.
14. See, e.g., Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in
Developing Countries: Is There a Violation of the International Human Right to
Health?, 8 Hum. Rts. Brief 12, 14 (2001); Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade
Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29 Ga. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 427, 435-37 (2001) (arguing that WTO protects intellectual property rights
at the expense of human rights and citing access to HIV/AIDS drugs as an example);
Csete, supra note 10, at 265 (asserting that access to HIV/AIDS treatment "has been
recognized as a human right"); Joint Statement, The Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Clinic of the Yale Law School et al., AIDS and Human
Rights: A Call for Action (June 26, 2001) ("Under trade agreements, governments
and international institutions should ... interpret pharmaceutical patent and property
laws consistent [sic] with the imperative of the right to health-and the right to life."),
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/06/ aids-ngos-0627.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Call for Action]; AIDS Drug Battle
Ends, Clears Way for Cheaper Treatment, CNNfyi.com, Apr. 19, 2001 (citing World
Health Organization official characterizing "access to affordable drugs [as] a 'human
rights issue"'), at http://www4.cnn.com/ 2001/fyi/news/04/19/africa.aids/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter AIDS Drug Battle
Ends].
15. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14, at 14.
16. See infra notes 28-190 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 28-122 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 28-122 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 123-90 and accompanying text.
1136 [Vol. 71
2002] ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HIV/AIDS DRUGS
access.21 Section A provides the normative framework for
understanding fundamental human rights under international law, and
the concomitant obligations to ensure those rights.21 This section then
builds on that framework to examine the rights implicated by lack of
access to HIV/AIDS treatment.22 Section B analyzes the human rights
obligations of corporations under a form of "soft law" corporate
duties, the corporate codes of conduct promulgated by multilateral
institutions.23
In Part III, this Note argues that access to HIV/AIDS drugs is a
human right, and that the drug companies' actions to prevent
developing countries from making HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable
violate the "soft law" human rights obligations of multinational
corporations under the multilateral corporate codes of conduct.24
Section A builds on the human rights framework established in Part
II.A to argue that access to HIV/AIDS drugs is a fundamental human
right.25 Section B argues that the multilateral codes of conduct call on
drug companies to respect host states' laws and policies that promote
the human right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment, and to respect
states' obligations under international law to protect, promote, and
fulfill the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment.26 It further argues
that drug corporations violate these "soft law" human rights
obligations when they challenge the actions of developing countries to
increase access to life-prolonging HIV/AIDS drugs.27
I. ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
A. The Debate over Intellectual Property Rights & Laws to Increase
Access to HIVIAIDS Drugs
The debate over governments' efforts to widen access to HIV/AIDS
drugs has centered around intellectual property rights and their
limits. 28 The United Nations (U.N.) and non-governmental human
rights organizations claim that patents are a major factor in the lack of
access to HIV/AIDS drugs,29 a point hotly disputed by the drug
20. See infra notes 191-287 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 218-57 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 258-87 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 288-375 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 316-75 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 316-75 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 29-190 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Carmen P~rez-Casas et al., Accessing ARVs: Untangling the Web of
Price Reductions for Developing Countries 3 (Mddecins Sans Fronti~res 2001)
(presenting graph showing how generic competition significantly drove down prices of
a sample triple-therapy cocktail in Brazil), available at
1137
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industry and its proponents.3" The industry promotes strong patent
protection for medicines, criticizes compulsory licensing and parallel
importing, and accuses developing countries such as South Africa of
violating their legal obligations under TRIPS by adopting laws such as
the Medicines Act Amendment." Developing countries and their
advocates support using compulsory licensing and parallel importing
to make drugs more affordable, and argue that laws designed to
increase access to drugs are legal under TRIPS' numerous public
interest exceptions.32 This section discusses intellectual property
rights as they relate to access to medicines and presents the debate
over patents, compulsory licensing and parallel importing, and
TRIPS.33
1. Patents: The Root of the Problem?
According to the United States International Trade Commission,
"[a] patent is a grant issued by a national government conferring the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
within the national territory."34  By investing exclusive rights in a
patent holder, patents give inventors a monopoly for a set period of
time; without competition from other manufacturers to drive the price
down, patent holders can charge high prices for their inventions. In
this way, patent rights function as an incentive for corporations to
invest in researching new drugs and to reveal their inventions, as well
as a reward for their costly investment. 36
The drug industry denies that patents are responsible for the lack of
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs.37 Instead, the industry blames other
http://www.globaltreatmentaccess.org/content/pressreleases/01 /100501_MSFRPTA
RVPrices.pdf [hereinafter Untangling the Web]; UNAIDS Update, supra note 1, at
9 (identifying competition with generic manufacturers as one factor responsible for
lowering drug prices); Sources & Prices, supra note 3, at 5 (identifying patents and
limited competition as factors that may affect drug affordability); Posting of James
Love, love@cptech.org, to ip-health@lists.essential.org, Request that WHO Seek
Compulsory Licenses for 5 Essential Antiretroviral Products in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Oct. 7, 2001), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/ 002012.
html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
30. See, e.g., PhRMA Global Challenge, supra note 6; see also Pollack, supra note
6.
31. See discussion infra Parts IL.A, 1.B.
32. See discussion infra Parts I.A, lI.B.
33. See infra notes 34-122 and accompanying text.
34. International Intellectual Property Law 3 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle
Long eds., 1997).
35. See Theodore C. Bailey, Note, Innovation and Access: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing in the Development and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001
U. I11. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 193, 202-04.
36. Id.; see also Bombach, supra note 6, at 282; Dolmo, supra note 12, at 154.
37. See Pollack, supra note 6; PhRMA Global Challenge, supra note 6
("Notwithstanding claims by developing nations and activists, pharmaceutical patents
are not hindering efforts to get more drugs to Africa.").
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barriers for the lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs, such as poverty,
poor health infrastructure, the lack of government commitment to
fighting HIV/AIDS, and cultural barriers in developing countries.3 s
Citing a recent study finding that most HIV/AIDS drugs are not under
patent in Africa, the industry maintains that developing countries are
thus free to import and manufacture generics.39 The study, published
in the Journal of the American Medical Association ("J.A.M.A."),
identifies the paucity of international aid as the main factor
responsible for the lack of HIV/AIDS drugs in Africa.4"
Several commentators have undermined the findings in the studies
on which the drug industry bases its claims.4 They point out, for
example, that the survey omits consideration of crucial drugs that are
indeed patented in Africa, and does not sufficiently consider the
impact of patents on new drug combinations of older drugs. 2 The
J.A.M.A. study itself verifies that thirteen of the fifteen HIV/AIDS
drugs surveyed are patented in South Africa.43 One scholar adopts
the World Health Organization's ("WHO") distinction among the
three different components of access to drugs: "therapeutic access,"
"physical access," and "financial access."" She concludes that,
specifically, financial access to drugs "is greatly affected by the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to exercise monopoly control of pricing
through exclusive patent rights."45
The industry's critics also dispute the contention that developing
38. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 3; PhRMA Global Challenge, supra note 6;
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Health Care in the
Developing World: Overview: Factors Affecting Global AIDS Fight, at
http://world.phrma.org/factors.affecting.aids.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review). The South African government, for example, has
thus far refused to use the tools that the Medicines Act Amendment put at its disposal
to provide free drug treatment. See Generic Drugs Press Release, supra note 9
(describing how "South Africans are mobilizing against a government they say is not
doing enough to fight [HIV/AIDS]").
39. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Health Care in the
Developing World: Intellectual Property and Access to AIDS Drugs, at
http://world.phrma.org/ip.access.aids.drugs.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter PhRMA Intellectual Property &
Access]; see also Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents For Antiretroviral
Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001).
40. See PhRMA Intellectual Property & Access, supra note 39.
41. See Bernard P6coul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries: A Lost
Battle?, 281 JAMA 361, 366 (1999); Sell, supra note 12, at 514-15; Posting of James
Love, love@cptech.org, to ip-health@lists.essential.org, Comment on
Attaran/Gillespie-White and PhRMA Patent Surveys (Oct. 16, 2001), at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/002089.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Attaran Study
Comment].
42. See Attaran Study Comment, supra note 41.
43. See Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 39, at 1888.
44. Rein, supra note 2, at 381.
45. Id.
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nations lack the infrastructure to properly use HIV/AIDS drugs. 46
Some countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay have
successfully implemented free HIV-treatment programs.47
Additionally, these critics argue that while other factors may impact
access to drugs, it would be a mistake to first "await solutions to all of
Africa's problems," and posit that the availability of affordable drugs
itself may spur the building of health infrastructure. 48
2. The Limits of Intellectual Property Rights?: The Debate over
Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importing as Tools to Increase
Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs
Compulsory licensing and parallel importing are two practices that
limit a patent holder's rights.49 Parallel importing is the government
importing of patented drugs from other countries where those same
patented drugs are cheaper."' Patented drugs may be cheaper
elsewhere because drug companies sell their products at varying prices
in different countries, and because different countries offer varying
levels of patent protection." In those countries with weaker levels of
patent protection, such as India, competition from generics drives
down the price of patented drugs.52 Parallel importing, including that
of pharmaceuticals, is a common practice in many European Union
countries and recently was sanctioned by the European Court of
Justice and the European Commission.53
Compulsory licensing of drugs is a government grant of permission
to third parties to manufacture generic versions of medicines under
46. See Generic Drugs Press Release, supra note 9 (discussing a project that
"shows that antiretroviral therapy is feasible in a resource-poor setting").
47. See UNAIDS Update, supra note 1, at 9 (noting, however, that in "low-
income countries.., health infrastructures are too frail to bring life-prolonging
treatments to the millions who need it").
48. Gellman, supra note 3; see also Bombach, supra note 6, at 286-87.
49. See generally Bailey, supra note 35, for a thorough discussion of compulsory
licensing, and Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray
Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 789 (2001) for a discussion of
parallel importing.
50. See Nash, supra note 10, at 490 ("Parallel imports are goods that are
purchased in a foreign market by an independent third party and later resold in the
domestic market where their much lower prices compete with those of authorized
distributors."). Parallel importing is distinct from the importing of generics.
51. Bailey, supra note 35, at 198-99; see also Rein, supra note 2, at 385 (noting that
"there are significant price differentials on the same medicines legally produced in, or
exported to, different countries").
52. Bombach, supra note 6, at 288; Rein, supra note 2, at 396-97. TRIPS provides
for a tiered compliance system, granting developing and least-developed countries
longer transitional periods. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 65. Thus, some developing
countries, such as India, offer weaker patent protection than other countries. See
Rein, supra note 2, at 390, 396-97.
53. Dolmo, supra note 12, at 147-49. In the United States, Congressional
members of the Democratic Party have been pursuing legislative measures to allow
parallel imports of drugs in the United States. Id. at 147.
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patent without the patent holder's authorization.54 In practice, the
introduction of several manufacturers of the drug promotes market
competition and reduces the drug's price; ultimately, compulsory
licensing can cut the prices of some drugs up to ninety percent." For
example, if South Africa were to issue a compulsory license to a
generic manufacturer to produce an HIV/AIDS drug, the government
could then purchase the cheaper generic version of that HIV/AIDS
drug from the generic manufacturer.
According to the drug industry, the drug development process is
lengthy, costly, and risky.56 Patent rights, which allow the inventors of
new drugs to charge high prices, are necessary to provide incentives
for the research and development ("R&D") of new drugs." The drug
industry argues that compulsory licensing and parallel importing, by
undermining the drug companies' exclusive patent rights, greatly
reduce the incentives for companies to invest in the R&D of new
drugs to treat diseases like HIV/AIDS 8 As a result, drug companies
will no longer allocate their resources to finding new HIV/AIDS
drugs.59 The drug industry claims that generic competition alone
already diminishes its profits by three billion dollars."'
Ultimately, the pharmaceutical industry's fundamental concern is
that lower prices in the more peripheral markets of developing
countries will have a negative effect on the much more significant
European and American markets.61 Lower prices in the developing
54. Bombach, supra note 6, at 276-77.
55. Id.
56. See Dolmo, supra note 12, at 154. A successful AIDS drug takes fourteen
years and costs over $360 million to develop and market, and a drug only has a one in
4,000 chance of actually making it to the market. Bailey, supra note 35, at 197; Dolmo,
supra note 12, at 154. According to PhRMA, in 2001 the industry invested over $30
billion in the R&D of new drugs. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, Health Care Advocates to Fight Efforts by Generic
Industry to Jeopardize the Progress in Medical Research (Feb. 25, 2002), at
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/ 25.02.2002.347.cfm (last visited Nov.
5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Additionally, the cost of the rare
drug that makes it onto the market must include the cost of researching and applying
for FDA approval for the thousands of unsuccessful drugs. See Bailey, supra note 35,
at 197.
57. Andrea M. Curti, Note, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An
Unlikely Weapon in the Fight Against AIDS, 27 Am. J.L. & Med. 469, 476 (2001).
58. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 210-11; Bombach, supra note 6, at 282; Pollack,
supra note 6 ("The Canadian experience suggests that protecting [patents] may
prompt greater investments by drug companies and even the development of a
homegrown industry.").
59. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 282.
60. See Curti, supra note 57, at 477 (accounting for differences in market sales in
developing world); Dolmo, supra note 12, at 155 (noting that Adock Ingram and
Glaxo-Wellcome blame parallel importing for, respectively, decline in stock value and
loss of profits).
61. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 287; Gellman, supra note 3; Pollack, supra note
6 (quoting the executive of a major drug company as stating that "[t]here was a
feeling that if a country deliberately went against Trips, there would be a castle-of-
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countries may undermine the willingness of Western consumers to pay
higher prices, and thus lead to pressure to lower prices in the major
drug markets. 62 Another possibility is that developed countries may
import cheaper patented HIV/AIDS drugs from developing
countries.63 Either way, the industry argues, this scenario would
decrease worldwide profits and substantially reduce the incentives for
companies to invest in researching new HIV/AIDS drugs.64
Since the pharmaceutical industry traditionally has failed to disclose
its R&D investments, many accuse the drug industry of inflating the
R&D costs that form the basis for the industry's opposition to
compulsory licensing and parallel importing." The industry's critics
assert that the drug industry spends twice as much on marketing than
on R&D efforts.66 Some critics also assert that the industry's very
high profitability itself belies any claims about the riskiness of
developing new drugs." Additionally, they point out that the
development of new drugs frequently is subsidized heavily by the
taxpayer's money and performed in publicly-funded laboratories.68
Thus, critics not only question the R&D claims that the industry uses
to attack compulsory licensing and parallel importing, but some also
argue that it is unfair for drug companies to reap huge profits from the
inflated prices they charge for products developed using taxpayer
money. 9
Many activists and scholars dispute the industry's contention that
compulsory licensing and parallel importing will eliminate the
cards effect").
62. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 287; see also Pollack, supra note 6.
63. Gellman, supra note 3.
64. Id.
65. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 284; Charlotte Denny & James Meek, Drug
Giants Made to Swallow Bitter Pill: Global Opinion Won in South Africa, But Will it
Triumph When the US Fights Brazil's Cheap Aids Medicine?, The Guardian, Apr. 19,
2001, 2001 WL 19602587 (referring to "the big pharmaceutical companies' lack of
financial transparency").
66. Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the
Poor, 20 Wis. Int'l L.J. 581, 584, 592 (Figure 2) (2002) (citing 1989 figures).
67. Treatment Action Campaign, TAC's Questions and Answers on its Friends of
the Court Status, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sarTACfoc.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review [hereinafter TAC Q&A].
68. See James Orbinski, Health, Equity, and Trade: A Failure in Global
Governance, in The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance
223, 226 (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2001) (noting that, according to M6decins Sans
Fronti~res, the research for the majority of patented anti-retrovirals was publicly
funded by the tax money of Europeans and Americans); Bombach, supra note 6, at
282 (noting that the American government holds the patent rights to many anti-
retrovirals; pharmaceutical companies then purchase exclusive rights to market those
drugs).
69. See, e.g., Denny & Meek, 2001 WL 19602587, supra note 65. The
pharmaceutical companies have also been criticized for advancing this defense when
they spend "disproportionate" amounts of money on the marketing and researching
of drugs for the "lifestyle problems" of the developing world. Id.
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incentives for research.7" They point out that since most people
cannot afford the high-priced brand-name drugs, profits from selling
drugs in developing countries are relatively miniscule.7 While seven
industrialized nations account for eighty percent of total revenues
from drug sales, the entire continent of Africa only accounts for one
percent.72 Thus, commentators conclude that Africa is not a major
factor in the R&D of the multinational drug companies.73
Supporters of generic competition also argue that compulsory
licensing may ultimately increase revenues for patent holders by
generating higher sales levels, since more people will be able to afford
the previously prohibitively expensive drugs.74  Furthermore,
compulsory licensing provides patent holders with revenue in the form
of royalties, since generic producers that are granted compulsory
licenses must typically pay the patent holder royalties.75
Even assuming that generic competition reduces the incentives to
invest in R&D, as one commentator argues, "it does not [necessarily]
follow that ... [this] will lead to a significant reduction from present
levels of research or even that such a reduction would be socially
undesirable."76 Instead, Bailey argues that "the present incentives to
invest are so strong that they would have to be weakened considerably
before there would be any reduction in the amount of pharmaceutical
research."77 Furthermore, while agreeing that the R&D of new drugs
is socially beneficial, Bailey argues that broad access to drugs is
equally or more socially desirable." Framing the conflict as one
between "the relative value of extensive research and development"
which leads to new drugs and "broad access to existing technology,"79
Bailey concludes that the "compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs
in developing countries contributes to a socially optimal balance
between discovery and distribution." '' TRIPS, which attempts to
balance intellectual property rights with the public interest, appears to
70. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 35, at 215-16.
71. See Gellman, supra note 3.
72. Id. (citing data of IMS Health which "supplies market data to the industry");
see also M6decins Sans Fronti~res Access to Essential Medicines Campaign & The
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in
Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases 8 (2001) (stating that
the developing world makes up 80% of the population but only purchases 20% of
global sales), available at http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatalshort.pdf
[hereinafter Fatal Imbalance]; Bombach, supra note 6, at 283.
73. A related issue is the pharmaceutical industry's lack of R&D investment for
neglected diseases, such as malaria and schistosomiasis, that afflict mostly the Third
World. See Fatal Imbalance, supra note 72, at 10-11.
74. See Dolmo, supra note 12, at 160-61.
75. See id.; Bombach, supra note 6, at 285.
76. Bailey, supra note 35, at 216.
77. Id. at 215.
78. See, e.g., id. at 201.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 195.
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support Bailey's conclusion, since it allows compulsory licensing under
certain conditions.8 '
3. The International Framework for Intellectual Property: TRIPS
The national laws of each country govern patent protection
domestically, including the practices of parallel importing and
compulsory licensing. 2 Since 1994, however, the domestic laws of
member states of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") must now
conform to TRIPS, a WTO treaty that establishes minimum standards
of copyright, trademark, and patent protection.13 The pharmaceutical
industry was instrumental in bringing about TRIPS. 4 "At the behest
of the private sector," the U.S. government "engaged in extensive
coercive economic diplomacy leading up to and during the
[negotiation of TRIPS]."85 For example, during the negotiation of
TRIPS at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade
Tariffs, the developing and developed nations disagreed on several
key issues. 6 The United States then threatened sanctions against
those developing nations opposed to the agreement and exerted
bilateral pressure for a strongly protectionist document. As a result,
the terms of TRIPS are widely perceived as favorable to developed
countries and the large corporations that originate from them.8
The pharmaceutical industry was active not only in pushing for
TRIPS, but also in the drafting of TRIPS itself, and was ultimately
successful in its lobbying efforts for strong protectionist provisions. 9
81. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31.
82. For example, the Patents Act, Act 57 of 1978 (S. Afr.), provides for patent
protection in South Africa.
83. See TRIPS, supra note 6; Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background,
Principles and General Provisions, in Intellectual Property and International Trade:
The TRIPS Agreement 3, 13 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
TRIPS also establishes enforcement standards for intellectual property protection,
and provides a binding dispute-settlement procedure for conflicts. See TRIPS, supra
note 6, Part III ("Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights"), Part V ("Dispute
Prevention and Settlement") of TRIPS, supra note 6; see also Curti, supra note 57, at
473-74 (describing TRIPS' dispute-resolution procedure).
84. See Sell, supra note 12, at 481, 484-89 ("If it had not been for the twelve
American-based transnational corporations of the Intellectual Property Committee
(IPC), there would be no Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) today.").
85. Id. at 489; see also Gathii, supra note 2, at 753-57.
86. Nash, supra note 10, at 485.
87. Id.; see also Gathii, supra note 2, at 757 ("The bilateral pressures of the United
States... were critical in leveling opposition to TRIPS in the Uruguay Round.");
Rein, supra note 2, at 393 (citing example of U.S. threats against Brazil).
88. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 761; Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate
Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 89,
108-09 (1993).
89. Sell, supra note 12, at 484-89; Bombach, supra note 6, at 277-78, 290; Curti,
supra note 57, at 473 (describing successful industry lobbying for favorable "pipeline
protection").
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Before TRIPS, countries were required only to afford foreign drug
companies the same treatment that they provided their domestic
companies.9" Thus, some developing countries did not offer patent
protection for drug products, allowing generic manufacturers to
provide more affordable drugs than would have been possible if
patents for drugs were required.91 TRIPS requires that, for the first
time, the developing countries that belong to the WTO provide patent
protection to drug products.92 As a result, many developing countries
and their supporters argue that TRIPS' protections for the drug
industry have impeded the developing world's efforts to cope with the
HIV/AIDS epidemic.93
Nevertheless, TRIPS contains several provisions that provide
developing countries with flexibility to address their HIV/AIDS
epidemics.94 Article 8(1), for example, provides a general public
interest exception to TRIPS that allows member states "to adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest."95  While Article 28 confers exclusive
rights on the inventor to manufacture, use, sell, or import its
invention,96 Article 30 allows states some room to limit such exclusive
rights and to take into account "the legitimate interests of third
parties." 7
Although TRIPS does not directly address parallel imports, Article
6 provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address
the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."98
According to one scholar, the "[e]xhaustion of rights doctrine holds
90. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 760-61 (referring to the required protection as "the
principle of national treatment"); Sell, supra note 12, at 481-82.
91. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 762; Rein, supra note 2, at 386; Sell, supra note 12,
at 481-82.
92. Sell, supra note 12, at 481, 482 ; see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
93. See, e.g., Bass, supra note 11, at 193 ("The TRIPS Agreement as it stands now
will hamper efforts to ... [provide] access to essential new medicines at affordable
prices.").
94. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7.
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id.; see also Gathii, supra note 2, at 729 (referring to the tension between the dual
logics of TRIPS: the commodity logic and the public policy logic); Curti, supra note
57, at 469-72 (noting that TRIPS attempted to balance the promotion of innovation
with the promotion of the public interest).
95. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8(l).
96. See id. art. 28.
97. See id. art. 30; see also Curti, supra note 57, at 479-86 (discussing use of article
30 of TRIPS for compulsory licensing in detail).
98. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 6. While Article 28(1)(a) grants the patentee the
exclusive right of importing its product, a footnote to that Article references Article 6.
Id. art. 28(1)(a) n.6.
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that once a rights holder introduces protected goods into the stream of
commerce, there is no restriction on how the goods may be further
distributed."99 Developing countries and their supporters argue that,
by leaving exhaustion to the discretion of the WTO member states,
TRIPS allows states to determine that a patent holder loses the
exclusive right to import goods after the first sale of the patented
goods; as such, TRIPS sanctions parallel importing.1""1 The drug
industry opposes parallel importing and has lobbied the U.S.
government to punish countries that allow parallel importing.""
Article 31 of TRIPS allows for domestic legislation permitting
compulsory licensing, subject to eight conditions, including "adequate
remuneration" to the patent holder."2  Many countries regularly
engage in compulsory licensing, which is legal under several American
laws.1"3  TRIPS specifies five grounds for granting compulsory
licenses, including a "national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency."" 4  In the case of a national emergency, TRIPS
relaxes the conditions for issuing compulsory licenses by waiving the
requirement that countries attempt to get permission from the patent
holder." 5 Nevertheless, TRIPS fails to define what constitutes a
national emergency. 1 6  Commentators argue that TRIPS does not
limit compulsory licenses to those grounds specified in Article 31.1l 7
As a result, they argue, member states may issue compulsory licenses
on other grounds consistent with the public interest exceptions found
99. Rein, supra note 2, at 384; see also Bombach, supra note 6, at 278.
100. See Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in Intellectual Property and International
Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 83, at 189, 204-05; Gathii, supra note 2, at
764; Nash, supra note 10, at 491 (noting that "the issue of parallel importation [is]...
an entirely domestic legal concern"); Bombach, supra note 6, at 289-90. But see
Dolmo, supra note 12, at 142 (interpreting TRIPS to bar parallel importing without
the permission of the patent holder); Sweeney, supra note 10, at 455-56 (interpreting
TRIPS as ambiguous on parallel importing).
101. See Submission of PhRMA for the "Special 301" Report on Intellectual
Property Barriers: Priority Watch List Country: South Africa (Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America 2002) ("[W]idespread parallel importation
would pose a serious threat to the viability of American pharmaceutical investment in
South Africa."), http://www.phrma.org/international/specia301/safrica.cfm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter PhRMA
Special 301 Submission: South Africa].
102. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31; see also Correa, supra note 100, at 208-16.
103. Dolmo, supra note 12, at 144 (accusing the United States of "bad faith" for
opposing South Africa's trade practices). Under the Bayh-Dole Act, the U.S.
government has permission to issue compulsory licenses for public health purposes
and the U.S. government regularly issues such licenses for several products. Id. at 146;
see also Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving the
Integrity of American Patents Overseas After the South African Medicines Act, 18
Dick. J. Int'l L. 553, 563-64 (2000) (indicating assertions that Hatch-Waxman Act
allowing special exception for pharmaceuticals may violate TRIPS).
104. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(b); see also Correa, supra note 100, at 210.
105. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(b).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 100, at 210; Nash, supra note 10, at 489.
2002] ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HIVAIDS DRUGS
in other TRIPS provisions."'
The pharmaceutical industry and the United States consistently
challenge laws designed to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable as
violations of TRIPS."9 Developing nations that have passed laws to
make HIV/AIDS drugs more widely available argue that such laws
are valid under TRIPS' public interest exceptions."' Their supporters
also endorse a flexible approach to TRIPS for developing nations
seeking to promote public health goals, asserting that TRIPS allows
compulsory licensing.'1'
The drug companies and the U.S. government have consistently
pushed for "TRIPS-plus" patent protection, forcing developing
countries to provide greater protection than the minimum standards
that TRIPS requires."' Under 19 U.S.C. § 2411, for example, the
United States Trade Representative has the discretion to sanction
countries for an "act, policy, or practice ... which (i) denies fair and
equitable.., provision of adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign
country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights."..3 Critics accuse the United States of hypocrisy, since several
of its national laws allow parallel importing and compulsory
licensing."4 Critics point out, for example, that during the anthrax
scare following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America,
the U.S. government considered the compulsory licensing of Cipro, an
anthrax antibiotic."5 Although, ultimately, the United States did not
issue compulsory licenses for Cipro, the U.S. government has been
accused of using the threat of compulsory licensing as leverage to
negotiate favorable terms from Bayer, Cipro's patent holder."6
At a conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the WTO's
Ministerial Council issued a declaration agreeing with the developing
countries' interpretation of TRIPS as allowing developing countries to
108. See Correa, supra note 100, at 210; Nash, supra note 10, at 489.
109. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 280 (describing policy "to pressure countries to
provide patent protection stronger than that afforded by the TRIPS Agreement").
'110. See Bass, supra note 11, at 199-200 (stating that developing countries adopt a
broad interpretation of TRIPS' "concessions" ).
111. See, e.g., Sources & Prices, supra note 3, at 7 ("[I]ntellectual property
standards... should take protection of public health into account.... Developing
countries can therefore use the flexibility of TRIPS provisions and its safeguards to
protect public health. This means that, under certain conditions, the TRIPS
Agreement enables governments to authorize the use ... of patented drugs against
the will of the patent owner.").
112. Sell, supra note 12, at 482.
113. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(d)(3)(b), 2411(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
114. See Kramer, supra note 103, at 563-64.
115. See Sell, supra note 12, at 495; Denise Gellene, Anthrax Cases Reshape Drug
Price Debate, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 2001, at C1.
116. Sell, supra note 12, at 515-16.
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take various measures to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable.'
17
Specifically, the Doha Declaration asserted that developing countries
have "the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted,""1 ' to
define the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a national emergency," 9 and to
utilize parallel importing of drugs. 2 " Although developing countries
pushed for a legally binding interpretation of TRIPS, the Doha
Declaration is a ministerial declaration and does not supercede
TRIPS. 2' The status of the Doha Declaration is unclear, and
interpretations of its import range from that of a "political statement"
to that of "persuasive authority in the interpretation of TRIPS in the
event of a dispute."'22
B. Case Study: The Battle over South Africa's Medicines Act
Amendment
The issues at stake in the debate over developing countries' efforts
to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable are well-illustrated by
South Africa's attempts to widen access to HIV/AIDS drugs and by
the lawsuit that the drug industry brought against the government to
challenge that law. 3 The post-apartheid Constitution guarantees
117. See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, para. 4,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (asserting that TRIPS "can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to...
promote access to medicines for all"), available at http://www.wto.org/english/the
wtoe/ministe/min0le/mindecl trips-e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
118. Id. para. 5(b).
119. Id. para. 5(c) ("Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS ... can represent a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.").
120. Id. para. 5(d) ("The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement... [on]
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish
its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge.").
121. Sell, supra note 12, at 517-18; Alan 0. Sykes, Trips, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution", 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 47, 54 (2002) (stating
that "ministerial declarations within the WTO are not legally binding in the dispute
resolution process, and in the event of a dispute the language of the treaties as
approved by national governments would prevail over any contradictory declaration
by the ministers").
122. See Sell, supra note 12, at 517-18 (citation omitted); Sykes, supra note 121, at
54.
123. First, the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa has reached astronomical
proportions, and UNAIDS estimates that the devastating impact of AIDS has
reduced the average life expectancy in South Africa from sixty-six to forty-seven
years. See UNAIDS Update, supra note 1, at 8, 16-18. Second, the overwhelming
majority of South Africans lack effective access to HIV/AIDS drugs: only one percent
of HIV-infected South Africans can afford potentially life-prolonging treatment. See
Philipkoski, supra note 4. As of October 2001, only 20,000 South Africans were being
treated with anti-retrovirals. Treatment Action Campaign, Bredell Consensus
Statement on the Imperative to Expand Access to Anti-Retroviral (ART) Medicines
for Adults and Children with HIV/AIDS in South [Africa] (released Nov. 19, 2001),
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South Africans the right to health care.124 To meet its constitutional
duty, South Africa adopted a national policy of promoting access to
essential drugs.125 To further that policy, in 1997, the South African
Parliament passed the Medicines Act Amendment, granting the
Minister of Health broad power to ensure access to affordable
drugs.126
1. The Legal Challenge: The Contours of South Africa's Law
Among other provisions to make HIV/AIDS drugs more
affordable, the new law authorizes the Minister of Health to adopt
regulations requiring pharmacists to prescribe generic versions of
drugs.127 The amendment further authorizes the Minister to create a
pricing committee empowered to recommend a transparent pricing
system for medicines. 128 This provision would force pharmaceutical
companies to justify the prices they charge and prevent pharmacists
from over-pricing drugs. 29
The most controversial provision of the amendment is section 10,
which provides,
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more
affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the
health of the public, and in particular may-
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Patents Act, 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights
with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic
shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been
put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her
consent;
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is
available at www.tac.org.za/Documents/ Statements/bredell3.pdf. Third, the
pharmaceutical companies' opposition to South Africa's attempts to make HIV/AIDS
drugs affordable took the drastic form of a lawsuit and was particularly well-
documented. See sources infra note 181.
124. See S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 27 ("Everyone has the right to have access to...
health care services, including reproductive health care.... The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realisation of each of these rights.").
125. See National Drug Policy for South Africa (1996), available at
http://196.36.153.56/doh/docs/policy/drugsjan1996.pdf.
126. See Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, §§ 10, 14.
127. Id. § 14 (inserting section 22F into original Medicines Act); see also Statement,
Treatment Action Campaign, An Explanation of the Medicines Act Amendment and
the Implications of the Court Victory (Apr. 24, 2001) (describing generic
substitution), http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/ns010424.txt (last visited Nov. 5, 2002)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter TAC Statement].
128. Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, § 14 (inserting section 22G into
original Medicines Act).
129. See TAC Statement, supra note 127.
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identical in composition, meets the same quality standard and is
intended to have the same proprietary name as that of another
medicine already registered in the Republic, but which is imported
by a person other than the person who is the holder of the
registration certificate of the medicine already registered and which
originates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer
as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be
imported;
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the
medicine referred to in paragraph (b). 131 1
There has been considerable debate over the scope of the Health
Minister's powers and the precise meaning of the provisions of section
10.131 On the one hand, South Africa intended the law only to provide
for parallel importing and generic substitution. 132 The pharmaceutical
industry, on the other hand, interpreted the amendment to give the
government much broader power.1 33 According to the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"), the law
appears to allow the Minister of Health to revoke pharmaceutical
patents in violation of South African law and TRIPS. 134 Considering
the amendment a violation of both the South African Constitution
and TRIPS, the industry brought suit against the South African
government.1
31
The drug industry attacked the law as unconstitutional because it
interpreted Section 10 to give the Minister of Health overly broad
powers of implementation, thereby effectively allowing her to deprive
the drug companies of their constitutional right to property. 136 The
drug industry also specifically attacked the constitutionality of, among
other provisions, the law's sections providing for generic drug
substitution 3 and a drug pricing committee.3  The South African
130. Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, § 10 (inserting section 15C into
original Medicines Act).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-57.
132. See Posting of James Love, love@cptech.org, to pharm-policy@lists.
essential.org, Report on Court Case Over South Africa Medicines [Act] (Mar. 4,
2001), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001 -March/000740.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Court
Case Report].
133. See PhRMA Special 301 Submission: South Africa, supra note 101.
134. Id.
135. See Notice of Motion, supra note 13.
136. See id., supra note 13, para. 4.3; see also id. paras. 2.1-2.3, 4.1, 7; Court Case
Report, supra note 132.
137. See Notice of Motion, supra note 13, paras. 4.1-4.5; Posting of James Love,
love@cptech.org, to pharm-policy@lists.essential.org (Mar. 5, 2001), March 5, 1st Day
of the Medicines Act Trial, at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-
March/000744.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter Trial First Day].
138. See Notice of Motion, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html,
supra note 13, paras. 5.1, 5.2.
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government argued that it has an express constitutional duty to
provide health care to its citizens, and that the Medicines Act
Amendment is critical to meeting that duty.139 As an adviser to the
South African government during the lawsuit framed the
government's stance, "[t]he South African government is defending its
right to establish its own health care policy within the limits
established by international law.' 4
The drug industry claimed that the South African law violated
TRIPS on several grounds. In their complaint, the drug companies
asserted that the law was inconsistent with Article 27 of TRIPS,
because it discriminated against drug patents by providing lesser
protections for drugs than for other inventions. 4' The industry
further argued that, as written, the law delegated broad powers to the
Minister of Health that would enable her to import generic versions of
patented drugs, as well as to issue compulsory licenses for the local
manufacture of generics under conditions beyond those that TRIPS
specifies.142 Outside the courtroom, the industry also leveled broader
challenges to the law's validity under TRIPS, claiming, for example,
that the amendment violated Article 28 of TRIPS by allowing parallel
importing.
143
Prior to the passage of the Medicines Act Amendment, South
Africa already had limited power to issue compulsory licenses under
the Patents Act of 1978.144 Thus, the South African government
139. See AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, supra note 4. In a thoughtful analysis of the
application of South Africa's constitutionally guaranteed socioeconomic rights to
private actors, one scholar concludes that "the terrible force of the patients' rights at
stake in the context of AIDS drug prices, and the links pharmaceutical companies'
power has to the state, suggest that these companies might rightly be found to have a
constitutional duty to provide access to their drugs." Stephen Ellmann, A
Constitutional Confluence: American "State Action" Law and the Application of South
Africa's Socioeconomic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
21, 53-61, 74 (2001).
140. Philipkoski, supra note 4.
141. Notice of Motion, supra note 13, para. 2.4.
142. See Nash, supra note 10, at 493 (asserting that the drug industry believed the
Medicines Act Amendment was inconsistent with TRIPS because it empowered the
Minister of Health with broad discretion to grant licenses under conditions beyond
those specified in TRIPS); David Pilling & Nicol Degli Innocenti, Drug Companies
Still Seeking Patents Law Deal, Fin. Times, Apr. 19, 2001, at 10 (describing drug
companies as asserting that "clause 15c of the 1997 legislation would, if passed, give
the health minister sweeping powers to buy or import the cheapest drugs available,
overriding existing patents without due process"); see also Trial First Day, supra note
137; Court Case Report, supra note 132.
143. Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America, Watch List: South
Africa (Feb. 18, 2000) (PhRMA's "Special 301" Submission for 2000) ("Furthermore,
the new law, at 15C(b) allows for the parallel importation, a violation of TRIPS
Article 28."), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/phrma/301-00/safrica.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
144. See Patents Act, Act 57 of 1978, §§ 4, 56 (S. Afr.). Section 4 provides that,
[A] Minister of State may use an invention for public purposes on such
conditions as may be agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of
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argued that its existing Patents Act already provided for compulsory
licensing, 45 that the amendment was not designed to permit
compulsory licensing, and that the government only intended to use
the law for parallel importing. 46 South Africa appears to have kept its
promise, since in the proposed regulations that the government later
issued pursuant to the amended law, the government only provided
for parallel importing.'47 In response to the claim that the law's
breadth allowed for practices beyond those specified under TRIPS,
the government argued that the law complied with TRIPS. 4 Some
scholars agreed with South Africa, arguing that "[s]o long as the
Minister of Health interprets the Act within the context of TRIPS,
and abides by the conditions described in Article 31, any activity
taken under the Act's compulsory licensing provision is valid under
international law. 1 49
The debate over the law's validity under TRIPS spilled out of the
courtroom and into the global community, and was taken up by
scholars, activists, government officials, and multilateral
organizations."1 The U.S. government initially adopted the industry's
stance, opposing the law because it was "potentially" in violation of
agreement on such conditions as are determined by the commissioner on
application by or on behalf of such Minister and after hearing the patentee.
Id. § 4.
145. Court Case Report, supra note 132.
146. Press Release, S. Afr., Medicines Control Act Regulations Ready for Public
Comment (June 4, 2001) ("There is a common misperception that the Medicines
Control Amendment Act deals with the importation or manufacture of generic
alternatives to drugs that are still patent-protected in South Africa."), at
http://196.36.153.56/doh/docs/pr/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) [hereinafter South Africa Regulations Press Release]; see also Trial
First Day, supra note 137; Court Case Report, supra note 132. At least one generic
manufacturer, Cipla, has applied to South Africa for compulsory licenses to produce
HIV/AIDS drugs, claiming that the patent-owners have "abused their dominance" by
"charg[ing] an exorbitant price ... to the detriment of consumers." Posting of James
Love, love@cptech.org, to ip-health@lists.essential.org, CIPLA-Medpro Complaint to
RSA Competition Commission (reproducing Complaint to the Competition
Commission by Cipla-Medro (PTY) Limited) (Oct. 8, 2001), at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/002026.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
147. See South Africa Regulations Press Release, supra note 146; see also Posting
of James Love, love@cptech.org, to ip-health@lists.essential.org, South Africa
Proposes New Parallel Import Regs, But No New Comp[ul]sory Licensing
[Procedures] (June 9, 2001) (noting that the government dropped an earlier proposal
to include provisions for compulsory licenses), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-
health/2001-June/ 001423.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
148. See Pilling & Innocenti, supra note 142 (stating that the South African
government has "consistently argued" that Section 15(c) complies with TRIPS);
Denny & Meek, supra note 65.
149. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 10, at 493-94.
150. See, e.g., id. (discussing the law's validity); Larkin Report,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb5l999.html, supra note 12 (discussing
U.S. involvement).
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TRIPS, was overly broad, and gave the Minister of Health excessive
power.15 1 Consistent with its TRIPS-plus policy, the U.S. repeatedly
sought assurances from South Africa that the Medicines Act
Amendment would not be implemented to allow parallel imports or
compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. 152 According to a group of
organizations that met with representatives of the U.S. government,
however, the United States failed to articulate the precise TRIPS
provisions it believed that South Africa's law violated. 53
Supporters of the legislation argue that it is valid under TRIPS'
exceptions for public policy decisions, such as Article 8, which allows
"measures necessary to protect public health.' 15 4 Other advocates of
the amendment argue that the AIDS epidemic in South Africa falls
within the TRIPS definition of a national health emergency, and is
valid under that provision.55 The general consensus is that the
Medicines Act Amendment is valid, so long as South Africa complies
with the provisions of TRIPS in its implementation.1 56 Notably, the
drug companies eventually dropped their claim that the Medicines
Act Amendment violated TRIPS and limited themselves to
challenging the law on constitutional grounds." 7
151. See Larkin Report, supra note 12; Press Statement, Aids Law Project, Meeting
with Representatives of the Government of the United States of America (Aug. 4,
1999), at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/cals/OLDalp/press/gore-press.shtml (last
visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter U.S
Meeting Press Release].
152. Larkin Report, supra note 12.
153. U.S. Meeting Press Release, supra note 151 (stating that when questioned
during a meeting, the U.S. government failed to indicate exactly how Section 15(c) of
Medicines Act violates international trade laws). Notably, the United States did not
use the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism TRIPS provides to challenge South
Africa's law, leading commentators to speculate that the United States feared a
decision for South Africa. See Bombach, supra note 6, at 281; Dolmo, supra note 12,
at 146 (noting that the United States failed to challenge South Africa's practices
under the WTO dispute-resolution mechanisms and speculating that the United
States realized that South Africa's practices were consistent with WTO rules).
154. Nash, supra note 10, at 489.
155. Denny & Meek, supra note 65 (noting that, in South Africa, "campaigners
argued that the [HIV/AIDS] crisis was an emergency" under the TRIPS definition).
156. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 10, at 493-94, 501 (noting that "[g]iven its
ambiguous wording, implementation of the Act may or may not comply with South
Africa's obligations under TRIPS") (emphasis added); Bombach, supra note 6, at 275
(concluding that "the use of compulsory licensing and parallel imports provided for in
the Bill are consistent with international law obligations, and in particular with the
TRIPS Agreement").
157. See Ghosh, supra note 49, at 814-15; Drug Companies Drop S. Africa Suit,
CNN.com, Apr. 19, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/04/18/
safrica.drugs.03/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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2. Outside the Courtroom: The Drug Companies' Campaigns
While pursuing their lawsuit against South Africa, the
pharmaceutical companies began to offer drugs at discounted prices
and to make drug donations of their expensive HIV/AIDS drugs to
South Africa and other developing countries. 5 , GlaxoSmithKline, for
example, announced that it would not enforce its patent on its
HIV/AIDS drug, Zerit, in South Africa.'59  In October 2001,
GlaxoSmithKline also voluntarily granted a local South African drug
manufacturer a license to produce and market generic versions of
three of its HIV/AIDS drugs. 6" The industry claims that its
''programs to improve public health ... are some of the most
effective."'' In 2000, the drug industry came together under the aegis
of the U.N. to coordinate direct negotiations, for discounted drugs,
between the drug companies and the governments of participating
nations. 6 ' Critics, however, have labeled this U.N. initiative a "public
relations gimmick."'63
Activists have also criticized the drug companies' independent
initiatives as flawed, inadequate, and unsuccessful."M The fatal
problems with these programs, activists argue, are that they are of
limited geographical scope and duration, reach a miniscule percentage
of the twenty-five million HIV-positive people in need of drugs, and
depend on the goodwill of the companies offering them.'65 The
programs' critics claim that even at reduced prices, patented drugs still
remain unaffordable to the majority of HIV/AIDS sufferers in the
developing world, particularly to those most in need of treatment. 6
158. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Secure the Future: Care and Support for
Women and Children with HIV/AIDS (2001), available at
http://www.securethefuture.com/; Untangling the Web, supra note 29, at 8;
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Global Partnerships:
Humanitarian Programs of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Developing Nations
(2000), available at www.world.phrma.org [hereinafter PhRMA Global Partnerships];
Sources & Prices, supra note 3, at 30-31.
159. See PhRMA Global Partnerships, supra note 158, at 16.
160. See GlaxoSmithKline is First South African HIV/AIDS Generic Drugs License
Deal, Marketletter, Oct. 14, 2001, 2001 WL 9081276.
161. PhRMA Global Partnerships, supra note 158, at 6 (claiming that a World
Bank report supports this assertion).
162. Sources & Prices, supra note 3, at 5, 16; Gellman, supra note 3 (listing the five
companies involved in the initiative as Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Merck, Boehringer
Ingelheim, Hoffman-La Roche, and Glaxo Wellcome).
163. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 769.
164. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 3 (quoting World Bank economist
characterizing the programs as "expensive boutiques ... available to a lucky few").
165. See id.; International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Pfizer
Betrays Promises, Puts Profits Before People: "Drug Donation" Scheme a Scam, June
23, 2000, at http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/ SouthAfrica2000Jun.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); TAC Statement, supra note
127.
166. See Csete, supra note 10, at 265 (noting that, even at reduced prices,
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Skeptics also suggest that drug companies are cutting their prices so
that they can argue that generic versions of drugs are unnecessary and
thereby preserve their patent rights.167  According to one
commentator, "maximal effective access to HIV/AIDS drugs depends
on adequate supply at near-production-cost prices which arguably are
not, and will not, be provided by pharmaceutical firms bearing patent-
based monopolies in these drugs because such behavior would not
maximize profits for these firms."'68 As a result, many activists see
generic competition as superior to the drug companies' voluntary
programs. 16 9
While pursuing these programs, however, the drug industry, one of
the largest lobbyists in the United States, simultaneously lobbied the
U.S. government to exert pressure on South Africa to change or
repeal its law. 7' As a result, high-ranking U.S. officials met
repeatedly with South African representatives to express the U.S.
government's condemnation of the law and to request its repeal, Vice
President Al Gore personally lobbied South African officials for the
repeal of the law, and the U.S. Congress threatened to withhold
foreign aid.17' Also as a direct result of the influence of the American
pharmaceutical industry, the U.S. government placed South Africa on
a "Special 301 Watchlist," sanctioned South Africa by denying it trade
privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences, and later
conducted a Section 301 investigation.' The United States
eventually reached a bilateral understanding with South Africa in
HIV/AIDS drugs remain too expensive for poor countries); Gellman, supra note 3
(stating that interviews and examination of records "suggest that nothing fundamental
has changed in the calculus of access to AIDS treatment").
167. See Pollack, supra note 6.
168. Bailey, supra note 35, at 209.
169. See Pollack, supra note 6.
170. Sell, supra note 12, at 501-02 ("At PhRMA's behest, the U.S. government
threw its full weight behind the South African case to press South Africa to revoke
the offending provisions of its law."). One American pharmaceutical company also
threatened to withdraw all of its operations from South Africa. David Benjamin
Snyder, Comment, South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act: A Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L.
175, 177 (1999).
171. Sell, supra note 12, at 501-02; Dolmo, supra note 12, at 151; Marcus Mabry,
Give Us This Day Our Daily Meds, Newsweek Int'l, July 5, 1999, 1999 WL 8074144;
see also Larkin Report, supra note 12.
172. See Larkin Report, supra note 12. Under the amended Trade Act of 1974, the
United States must identify countries without effective patent protection for U.S.
intellectual property. United States Trade Representative, Special 301 Report 13-14
(2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/special.pdf. Those countries
with the most inadequate protection are published in the Federal Register as "Priority
Foreign Countries;" the United States also publishes a "priority watch list" and
"watch list" of countries. Id. at 16-32. Under "Special 301," the U.S. typically
conducts investigations of intellectual property protection in those countries
identified as a "Priority Foreign Country." Id. at 14.
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December 1999.173
The controversy between South Africa and the multinational
pharmaceuticals was highly publicized in the international media and
sparked domestic and international discussion and mobilization.174
Several international institutions, including the U.N., the World
Health Assembly ("WHA") and the European Parliament, supported
South Africa's efforts to make drugs affordable. 17  The WHA, for
example, passed a resolution declaring that public health concerns are
"paramount" to intellectual property rights.176 Public opinion was
overwhelmingly against the pharmaceutical companies, as people
understood the drug industry's actions to be a choice of patents and
profits over lives.
77
In April 2001, after widespread negative publicity, the drug
companies withdrew their lawsuit and reached an out-of-court
settlement with South Africa. 7 s The companies agreed to cooperate
173. See Posting of James Love, love@cptech.org, to pharm-policy.essential.org,
Press Statement, S. Afr. Dep't of Trade and Industry, Joint Understanding Between
the Governments of South Africa and the United States of America (Sept. 17, 1999),
at http://lists.essential.org/pharm-policy/msg00244.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). South Africa assured the United States that "in
the implementation of provisions of the Medicines Act ... it will honour its
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement." Id. Subsequently, in May 2000, President
Clinton issued an Executive Order asserting that the United States would not
challenge the policies of sub-Saharan African countries to increase access to
HIV/AIDS medications, as long as they complied with TRIPS. See Gathii, supra note
2, at 750.
174. See, e.g., AIDS Drug Battle Ends, supra note 14 (noting opposition by public
and human rights advocates to the drug companies' policies); AIDS Drugs Case
Adjourned, supra note 4 (citing former South African President Nelson Mandela's
criticism of the companies as exploitive for using the lawsuit to protect their profits);
Denny & Meek, supra note 65 (describing how "[i]nternational public opinion and a
worldwide web of activists" played a role in changing the corporations' minds).
175. See Pollack, supra note 6; Posting of UNAIDS, to treatment-access@hivnet.ch
Press Statement, UNAIDS, UNAIDS Welcomes Outcome of South African Court
Case (Apr. 19, 2001) (indicating that "UNAIDS has consistently supported" the
intent of the Medicines Act Amendment), at
http://www.hivnet.ch:8000/topics/treatment-access/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter UNAIDS Welcomes Outcome].
176. See Dolmo, supra note 12, at 143 (attributing WHA resolution to lobbying by
public health and consumer interest groups).
177. See, e.g., Pilling & Innocenti, supra note 142 (noting that "public opinion
turned against" the drug companies); AIDS Drug Battle Ends, supra note 14 (noting
opposition by public and human rights advocates); AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned,
supra note 4 (citing an Oxfam executive referring to this as the "'Vietnam of the drug
industry'); Denny & Meek, 2001 WL 19602587, supra note 65 ("[T]he public
perception was that the companies were more interested in protecting their
intellectual property rights than in the health crisis in the continent.").
178. See In the Matter Between: The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association
of South Africa et al., and the President of the Republic of South Africa et al., Joint
Statement of Understanding Between the Republic of South Africa and the
Applicants (Apr. 19, 2001), available at www.canadapharma.org/Media-Centre/
NewsReleases/2001/JointStatementlndustrySAGovt-April19-01_e.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Drug Company Settlement]; see also Dolmo, supra note 12,
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with South Africa to provide HIV/AIDS drugs at lower costs, and
South Africa agreed both to honor TRIPS and to consult with the
pharmaceutical industry on the proposed amendment.7 9 While
PhRMA claims that the legal challenge was dropped because the
South African Minister of Health promised to redraft the law,180 many
commentators attribute the resolution of the legal challenge to the
negative publicity that surrounded the lawsuit.' Across the globe,
many people and organizations welcomed the end of the litigation,18 2
which has been characterized as "one of the great corporate PR
disasters of all time.' 83
Although the South African lawsuit was resolved and some
programs have been implemented to provide wider access to
HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries,'84 HIV/AIDS drugs still
remain unaffordable to the majority of HIV-infected people in
developing countries.'85 The drug donations and discounts offered by
pharmaceutical companies are not permanent solutions to the lack of
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs.'86  Moreover, the pharmaceutical
corporations and the American government continue to exert their
substantial influence to prevent developing countries from
implementing laws like South Africa's Medicines Act Amendment.8 7
For example, the pharmaceutical industry recently opposed the
enactment of Kenyan legislation that would allow compulsory
licensing and parallel importing to make HIV/AIDS drugs cheaper.'88
Despite enacting laws permitting compulsory licensing, developing
at 145; AIDS Drug Battle Ends, supra note 14.
[79. See Drug Company Settlement, supra note 178; see also Dolmo, supra note 12,
at 145 (stating that the settlement was perceived as considering industry "as a partner
rather than [as] an antagonist").
180. See Gumisai Mutume, Trade: U.S. Drug Companies Ease Up on South Africa,
Inter Press Service, Sept. 12, 1999, 1999 WL 27373954.
181. See, e.g., Curti, supra note 57, at 477; Pilling & Innocenti, supra note 142
("Cast in the role of villains.., pharmaceutical companies have opted for damage
limitation."); Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS
Medicine, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 2001, at Al (stating that, by dropping the lawsuit, the
drug industry was "[b]owing to mounting public pressure"); Denny & Meek, 2001,
supra note 65; Drug Companies Drop S. Africa Suit, supra note 157 (characterizing
the withdrawal of the lawsuit as "the end of a public relations disaster").
182. See, e.g., UNAIDS Welcomes Outcome, supra note 175 (stating that UNAIDS
further recommended that other countries enact similar legislation to make
HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable).
183. Denny & Meek, supra note 65.
184. See Drug Company Settlement, supra note 178; see also supra notes 158-62
and accompanying text (discussing drug companies' humanitarian programs).
185. See Csete, supra note 10, at 265; Gellman, supra note 3.
186. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of the
drug industry's humanitarian programs).
187. See, e.g., Samuel Siringi, Generic Drugs Battle Moves from South Africa to
Kenya, The Lancet, May 19, 2001, 2001 WL 10158786.
188. See id. (noting that "officials from the main pharmaceutical companies have
been lobbying government ministers and committees involved in drafting the Bill").
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countries are reluctant to follow through and issue compulsory
licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs because of pressure from the
pharmaceutical industry and the American government it lobbies.189
Thus, developing nations continue to struggle with the problem of
ensuring affordable HIV/AIDS drugs to their populations, while the
pharmaceutical industry and the United States continue to challenge
their efforts, arguing that these efforts undermine intellectual
property rights and international obligations under TRIPS.9 '
II. ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS & HUMAN RIGHTS
At stake in the debate over measures to increase access to
HIV/AIDS drugs are not only the intellectual property rights of drug
companies, but also the human rights of those people in developing
countries infected with HIV/AIDS who cannot afford high-priced
patented drugs.'9' Thus, scholars and human rights activists argue that
TRIPS is being interpreted and implemented in violation of the rights
to life and health.'92 Activists and commentators further argue that
donor nations are violating their duties, under international law, to
engage in international cooperation to protect the human right to
health.'93 One commentator suggests that developed nations also may
violate human rights by failing to prevent those multinational drug
companies in their jurisdictions from impeding the efforts of
developing nations to fulfill their human rights obligations to ensure
access to HIV/AIDS drugs.'94
189. See Pollack, supra note 6; Human Rights Watch, WTO Summit: Don't
Undercut AIDS Drug Access (Nov. 7, 2001) (noting that, while developed countries
have used compulsory licensing, "no low-income developing country has succeeded in
obtaining a compulsory license for generic AIDS drugs" and that "[t]he United
Nation's Development Programme's 'Human Development Report 2001' attributes
this disparity to threats from Europe and the United States"), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/wto-aidsllO7.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
190. See, e.g., Sell, supra note 12, at 495 (noting that, in sanctioning Argentina, "the
USTR 'admitted that it had decided to enforce these patent law related sanctions
based entirely on information and data supplied by PhRMA' (citations omitted)).
191. See, e.g., Sam Ricketson, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in
Commercial Law and Human Rights 187, 208-09 (Stephen Bottomley & David Kinley
eds., 2002) (outlining "the possible countervailing human rights claims that may arise
where patents are granted and exploited"); Sell, supra note 12, at 497 (describing how
AIDS activists framed the issue in public health terms); AIDS Drug Case Adjourned,
supra note 4 (citing an AIDS activist as stating that "'[tihe right to life, dignity and
health supercedes the right of drug companies to profiteer"'). See generally Csete,
supra note 10 (describing set of human rights implicated by lack of HIV/AIDS
treatment).
192. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 14, at 437; Call for Action, supra note 14.
193. See, e.g., Call for Action, supra note 14 (stating that states have a duty to
engage in international cooperation to promote human rights and that donor nations
are violating "their obligations to protect the right to health through cooperative,
supportive activities").
194. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 13 (asserting that a human rights treaty binds
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During the controversy in South Africa, human rights activists also
accused the drug companies themselves of violating human rights. 95
Activists argue, for example, that drug corporations violate
fundamental human rights when they prevent developing countries
from fulfilling their international obligations to provide their
populations with affordable medicines. 196 While human rights law
developed primarily to hold states accountable for human rights
violations, globalization forced international law and institutions to
reckon with the emergence of multinational corporations as major
actors in human rights violations. 97 As a result, today corporations
have human rights obligations under international law, and there are a
multitude of mechanisms to enforce and regulate those obligations.'
This part explores the human rights that may be implicated by the
lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs, and examines one source of
corporate human rights obligations: the "soft law" of multilateral
corporate codes of conduct. 99
A. Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: Defining the Human Rights at Stake
According to one scholar, "[i]nternationally recognized human
rights are those included in the International Bill of Human Rights or
those elaborated on in subsequent instruments adopted by the UN
General Assembly." '  The International Bill of Human Rights
(International Bill) consists of the Universal Declaration and the two
primary human rights conventions, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant
signatory states to "prevent third parties from violating the right [to health] in other
countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political
means").
195. See, e.g., AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, supra note 4; Press Release, Oxfam,
Drug Giants Set to Cause Violation of Human Rights: Oxfam Calls for Urgent UN
Investigation (Nov. 4, 2001), at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/cutcost6. htm
(last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Drug
Giants Press Release].
196. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14, at 14; Drug Giants Press Release, supra
note 195 (["Tjhe companies' court action against the South African government over
its attempts to get cheap drugs to its people, prevent[s] the South African government
from fulfilling its international human rights obligations.").
197. See generally Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 Minn.
J. Global Trade 153 (1997); Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to
International Law, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 655, 659-60 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 801 (2002).
198. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 197, at 802-03 (asserting that "human rights law can
reach private corporations"). See generally Sidney Dell, The United Nations and
International Business (1990) (discussing the regulation of business by the U.N.).
199. See infra notes 200-87 and accompanying text.
200. Asbjorne Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 21, 21 (Asbjorne Eide et al. eds.,
1995).
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on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").2 °'
1. The Normative Framework
Adopted in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
"contains the whole range of human rights within one consolidated
text."2 2 While it is not a formal treaty, the Universal Declaration has
a special legitimacy in international law." 3 The ICCPR and the
ICESCR are legally binding on those states that ratify them,
obligating those states to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights
enshrined in the conventions."I United Nations resolutions further
elaborate on the human rights guaranteed in the International Bill, as
well as on the concomitant obligations of states, but are not legally
binding.205
Within this framework, specific human rights have generally been
divided into two categories, tracking the two major human rights
conventions: civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural
rights.2"6 Traditionally, economic, social, and cultural rights, such as
the right to health, have attracted less attention and hold a weaker
status than civil and political rights." 7  The marginalization of
201. See Matthew C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development 1 (1995); Eide, supra note
200, at 21; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
[hereinafter ICCPRJ; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
202. Eide, supra note 200, at 22; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 201.
203. Mark E. Wojcik, AIDS and International Human Rights Law, 35 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 423, 426 n.140 (2002) (asserting that nations "have endowed it with great
legitimacy through their actions, including its legal and political invocation at the
national and international levels" (citing Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human
Rights, in Health and Human Rights: A Reader 9 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds.,
1999))); Geoff Larson, The Right of International Intervention in Civil Conflicts:
Evolving International Law on State Sovereignty in Observance of Human Rights and
Application to the Crisis in Chechnya, 11 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 251, 264
(2001) (stating that the Universal Declaration "has, in the minds of many highly
regarded international law scholars, attained the status of customary law").
204. See Craven, supra note 201, at 109 ("According to the tripartite typology, all
human rights entail three forms of State obligation, viz. the obligation to respect,
protect and fulfil."); Asbjorne Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Universal Challenge, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook,
supra note 200, at 15, 15.
205. Eide, supra note 200, at 21.
206. Eide & Rosas, supra note 204, at 15.
207. Id.; see also Craven, supra note 201, at 9, 16 (concluding that "there are no
really convincing arguments either for denying economic, social, and cultural rights
the status of human rights or for maintaining absolute distinctions between them and
civil and political rights"); Brigit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right
in International Law 5-6 (1999) (asserting that "in practice, particularly Western
States and NGOs have tended to treat economic, social and cultural rights as if they
were of less importance than civil and political rights").
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economic, social, and cultural rights rests in part on the perception
that they "lack the essential characteristics of universality and
absoluteness. '2°8 An additional basis of distinction between these two
categories of rights is the nature of states' obligations with respect to
implementation.2 9 Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR allows states to
implement the rights "progressively" and "to the maximum of...
available resources. ' 210  For these reasons, "many authors are of the
opinion that economic and social rights, because of their very nature,
are not 'justiciable' in the sense that they are not capable of being
invoked in courts of law and applied by judges. 211
Academics debate whether the human rights instruments discussed
above bind corporations.2 2 One view is that "[a] number of
international instruments make it clear that rights exist between
private individuals or bodies." ' 3  For example, the Universal
Declaration specifies that everyone has duties to the community. 14
Furthermore, its Preamble specifies that "every organ of society...
shall strive ... to promote respect for these rights and ... to secure
their universal and effective recognition and observance. '215  Thus,
some commentators argue that corporations are "organs of society"
and, therefore, have an obligation under the Universal Declaration to
respect human rights. 216 As one commentator argues, "if the drafters
208. Craven, supra note 201, at 10.
209. See id. at 106.
210. ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 2(1).
211. Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, supra note 200, at 41, 41; see also Craven,
supra note 201, at 10.
212. See, e.g., David Kinley, Human Rights as Legally Binding or Merely Relevant?,
in Commercial Law and Human Rights, supra note 191, at 25, 37-38; Alexander, supra
note 14, at 13-14. But see Frey, supra note 197, at 163 (stating that "it is unclear
whether [corporations] are bound to respect the[] rights" guaranteed in the Universal
Declaration); Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability Of Human Rights
Standards To Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 Am. J. Comp. Law
531, 544-45 (2002) (Section IV) (asserting that "[o]n their face, international human
rights instruments do not appear to apply to corporations").
213. Kinley, supra note 212, at 37-38.
214. See Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 29.
215. Id. at Pmbl.
216. See, e.g., Amnesty International Human Rights Principles for Companies,
ACT 70/01/98 (1998) (discussing the Universal Declaration and asserting that
"[c]ompanies and financial institutions are organs of society.... All companies have a
direct responsibility to respect human rights in their own operations"), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT700011998 [hereinafter Amnesty
International Principles]; U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Human Rights Principles and
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 54th
Sess., pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/XX, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1
(February 2002 for discussion in July/August 2002) (acknowledging that
"transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are
also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights"),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/principlesW-OutCommentary5final.html (last visited
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of the [Universal Declaration] intended to limit the scope of who
should promote and recognize human rights to public, state actors,
they could have used the phrase 'every State' rather than 'every organ
of society.' 217
2.The Specific Human Rights at Stake
Human rights activists and commentators argue that access to
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs is a human right or is a component of
other internationally guaranteed human rights, such as the rights to
health, life, development, and enjoying the benefits of scientific
progress.218 In 1946, WHO declared the right to health a fundamental
human right.2 9 Subsequently, the Universal Declaration enshrined
the right to health as a fundamental human right, and the ICESCR
later legally obligated signatory states to respect, protect, and fulfill
the right to health. 22' The Universal Declaration guarantees all
persons "the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including.., medical care. '221
Article 12 of the ICESCR obligates state parties to "recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health. 222
The contours of the right to health are ill-defined in international
law. 223 As a result, it is unclear whether the right to health under
international law specifically encompasses the right to affordable
drugs.224 The Universal Declaration recognizes that "[e]veryone has
the right to... medical care. '225 Additionally, the ICESCR requires
Oct. 30, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Code];
Alexander, supra note 14, at 14 (asserting that "[a] pharmaceutical corporation
arguably is an 'organ of society'); Globalise This: Human Rights, OECD Observer
38, May 1, 2002, 2002 WL 1.00074990 ("The universal declaration ... calls upon 'every
individual and every organ of society' to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms and to ensure their observance.").
217. Alexander, supra note 14, at 14.
218. See, e.g., Csete, supra note 10, at 265; Nanda & Lodha, supra note 66, at 581.
219. Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to
HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 105, 105 (2002)
(citing WHO Constitution, Pmbl., 62 Stat 2679,14 U.N.T.S. 185 (1948)).
220. See ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 12(1); Universal Declaration, supra note
201, art. 25(1); see also Craven, supra note 201, at 109-14 (describing states'
obligations under the ICESCR as including the duties to respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights).
221. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 25(1).
222. ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 12(1).
223. See, e.g., Toebes, supra note 207, at 4 (asserting that "the precise content of
the right to health as a socio-economic right allows for much confusion" and that "the
term is used without being clear what the exact meaning of the right to health exactly
entails"); Torres, supra note 219, at 108.
224. See Katarina Tomagevski, Health Rights, in Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Textbook, supra note 200, at 125, 125 (noting that "[a]ccess to health care
as an individual right does not enjoy global recognition").
225. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 25(1).
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states to "assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness" and to take steps towards the treatment of epidemic
diseases. 226 Thus, many activists and scholars argue that "access to
medicines is an essential part of access to health.
227
Several recent developments suggest that the right of access to
medical treatment may be a component of the right to health. 228 For
example, the U.N. committee that supervises the implementation of
the ICESCR has interpreted the right to health guaranteed in the
ICESCR to include the rights to treatment of epidemic diseases,
access to affordable health services, and the provision of essential
drugs.22 9 In its General Comment 14, the committee further specifies
that states' duties to protect the right to health include "the duties...
to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to
health care and health-related services provided by third parties," as
well as to "ensure that third parties do not limit people's access to
health-related information and services. '' 23°  The committee's
interpretations are not legally binding, but they "may be said to have
considerable legal weight. ' 231' Thus, some scholars argue that state
signatories to the ICESCR have a binding obligation to protect and
promote the right to health by guaranteeing affordable health care,
including drugs.232
Moreover, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has passed a
resolution acknowledging that access to HIV/AIDS medications is
"one fundamental element for achieving progressively the full
realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health. '233 The resolution
226. ICESCR, supra note 201, arts. 12(2)(c)-(d).
227. Nanda & Lodha, supra note 66, at 581; see also Toebes, supra note 207, at 116-
17 (asserting that "accessibility of health care services is a crucial element of the right
to health" and categorizing accessibility as financial, geographic and cultural); Csete,
supra note 10, at 265.
228. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 736 (noting that "there have been significant
developments that have already laid a rights framework to facilitate access to
essential medicines").
229. See ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. (CESCR General Comment 14), 22nd
Sess., paras. 16, 12(b), 17, U.N. Doe. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (defining economic
accessibility as one of the elements of the right to health and specifying that "health
facilities, goods and services must be affordable for all"), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Reader/ [hereinafter Comment 14]; see also Craven,
supra note 201, at 4 (referring to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) as the "primary supervisory body" of the ICESCR).
230. Comment 14, supra note 229, para. 35.
231. Craven, supra note 201, at 4.
232. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14, at 14.
233. Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, Hum.
Rts. Comm'n Res. 2001/33, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 3, 71st mtg. at 169,
para. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/167 (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Medicines Access
Resolution]; see also Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002: Special Issues and
Campaigns: HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (2002),
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further calls on states to adopt policies to ensure the availability of
HIV/AIDS medications. 34  Most recently, the U.N. revised its
guidelines to states on HIV/AIDS and human rights "to reflect new
standards in HIV treatment and evolving international law on the
right to health." '235 The new Guideline 6 specifically asserts that states
should "take measures necessary to ensure for all persons.., the
availability and accessibility of [HIV/AIDS treatment] ... including
antiretroviral and other safe and effective medicines." 236
In addition to these developments under international law, there is
also recent domestic case law defining the right to health to include
the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment.237 In Cruz Bermiidez v.
Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, the Venezuelan Supreme
Court held that the national government violated the right to access
HIV/AIDS drugs by failing to provide its citizens with those drugs. 38
According to one commentator, the court reached its holding that the
right to health included the right to access to treatment by taking into
account both the Venezuelan Constitution and unspecified
"international legal principles. '239 Similarly, the South African High
Court held that the government breached the right to health by failing
to provide HIV/AIDS treatment to pregnant women who are HIV-
positive, in order to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission.24
Unlike the court in Cruz Berm adez, however, the South African court
reached its holding that access to HIV/AIDS drugs was a right on the
basis of the South African constitution alone, and did not explicitly
recognize access to HIV/AIDS treatment as an internationally
guaranteed right.24'
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/hivaids.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
234. See U.N. Medicines Access Resolution, supra note 233, para. 2.
235. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights & Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights:
International Guidelines: Third International Consultation on HIV/AIDS and
Human Rights, at 5 (2002) (pre-publication edition), available at
http://www.unaids.org/humanrights/ [hereinafter U.N. HIV Guideline 6].
236. Id. at 13.
237. See Torres, supra note 219, at 106 (discussing "the 1999 decision of the
Venezuelan Supreme Court in Cruz Bermtidez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia
Social, in which the Court held the government's failure to provide ... access to ARV
therapies violated their right to health"); see also Treatment Action Campaign v.
Minister of Health, Case No. 21182/2001, at 60 (S. Afr. 2001), available at
http://www.tac.org.za/ [hereinafter TAC Lawsuit].
238. See Torres, supra note 219, at 106 (citing Cruz Bermddez v. Ministerio de
Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Republica de Venezuela,
Expediente Numero: 15.789 (1999), available at http://www.csj.gov.ve/
sentencias/SPA/spa15071999-15789. html).
239. Id. at 111 (citing Cruz Bermddez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social,
Corte Suprema de Justicia, Republica de Venezuela, Expediente Numero: 15.789
(1999), available at http://www.csj.gov.ve/sentencias/SPA/spa15071999-15789. html).
240. TAC Lawsuit, supra note 237, at 60.
241. Id. at 49, 60.
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In addition to the right to health, other internationally guaranteed
human rights may be linked to access to affordable HIV/AIDS
treatment. 42 During the controversy in South Africa, for example,
human rights activists linked the right to HIV/AIDS drugs to the right
to life.243 Under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, "everyone has
the right to life, liberty and the security of person. 244 Article 6 of the
ICCPR states that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. '245  In its general comment
interpreting the right to life in the ICCPR, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee adopts a broad interpretation of the right to life, requiring
states to "adopt positive measures.., to eliminate.., epidemics. 246
The European Human Rights Convention provides a more detailed
description of the right to life.247
Access to HIV/AIDS drugs may also be tied to the right to
development. 248  The right to development is guaranteed in the
Universal Declaration, which specifies that "[e]veryone is entitled to
a social and international order in which the rights.., set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized. '249 The Declaration on the Right to
Development ("Development Declaration") further defines the right
to development, recognizing the right to development as "an
inalienable human right,"25 and giving states the right and duty "to
formulate appropriate national development policies.., on the basis
of... the fair distribution of the benefits resulting."25' Specifically,
the Development Declaration urges states to take all of the necessary
steps to ensure "equality of opportunity for all in their access to...
health services.2152 Thus, as one commentator concludes, "the right to
development may provide a further basis for national patent systems
making... provision [for compulsory licensing] in developing
countries." '253
Similarly, some argue that "[t]o give effect to [the rights to share in
242. Ricketson, supra note 191, at 208-09 (citing the "rights to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits" and the "rights to development").
243. See, e.g., Call for Action, supra note 14.
244. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 3.
245. ICCPR, supra note 201, art. 6(1).
246. Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Comments Under Article
40, paragraph 4 of the Covenant, General Comment 6 (16), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex V, at 93-94, paras. 5, 37, U.N. Doc A/37/40 (1982).
247. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2,213 U.N.T.S. 221,224.
248. See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128
(Annex), U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986)
[hereinafter Development Declaration]; Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art.
28; Ricketson, supra note 191, at 209.
249. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 28.
250. Development Declaration, supra note 248, art. 1(1).
251. Id. art. 2(3).
252. Id. art. 8(1).
253. Ricketson, supra note 191, at 209.
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scientific advancement and its benefits] dictates, at the very least, the
need for reasonable exceptions to protection that allow for research
and development by third parties." '254 The right to share in scientific
progress is also guaranteed under international law.255 The Universal
Declaration, for example, states that everyone "has the right.., to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits." '56  Similarly, the
ICESCR guarantees all persons the right "[t]o enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications. 2
57
B. Source of Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: Corporate
Codes of Conduct
The U.N. and other multilateral institutions, non-governmental
organizations, national governments, and corporations themselves
have all sought to regulate the human rights activities of multinational
corporations through a variety of mechanisms.25 One popular form of
corporate regulation is the use of codes of conduct.259 Several
corporations, most notably Gap and Levi Strauss, have adopted their
own corporate codes of conduct, which set out policies and
mechanisms for addressing human rights violations internally.2
60
254. Id. at 208; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Human Rights and
Public Health in the AIDS Pandemic 31 (1997) ("The right to share in the benefits of
scientific progress has particular import in the HIV/AIDS pandemic.").
255. See ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 15(1)(b); Universal Declaration, supra note
201, art. 27(1).
256. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 27(1).
257. ICESCR, supra note 201, art. 15(1)(b).
258. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2 (1994) (prohibiting
bribing of foreign officials); Dell, supra note 198 (describing U.N. regulation of
transnational corporations); Sustainability Reporting Guidelines on Economic,
Environmental, and Social Performance (Global Reporting Initiative 2000) (using
disclosure as a mechanism to regulate corporate human rights abuses), available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/GRIGuidelines/June2000/June2000GuidelinesDownlo
ad.htm. For a more complete discussion of disclosure and multinational corporations,
see generally S. J. Gray et al., Information Disclosure and the Multinational
Corporation (1984).
259. See, e.g., Model Business Principles (United States Dep't of Commerce 1996),
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/usmodel.htm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002) (national government code); Amnesty International Principles, supra
note 216 (non-governmental organization code). For a more complete discussion of
the regulation of transnational corporations through codes of conduct, see Judith
Richter, Holding Corporations Accountable: Corporate Conduct, International
Codes, and Citizen Action (2001).
260. See Frey, supra note 197, at 177 (classifying internal codes into three
categories: "vendor standards regarding forced and child labor; standards in support
of civil and political rights; and criteria for investment"); see, e.g., Email from Gap
Customer Service, to Lissett Ferreira, Symposium Editor, Fordham Law Review
(11/2/2002, 5:40:22 PM) (including Gap Code of Vendor Conduct) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review); Levi Strauss & Co., Social Responsibility/Global Sourcing &
Operating Guidelines, at http://www.levistrauss.com/responsibility/
conduct/guidelines.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). While these corporate codes of conduct reflect a positive trend in the
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Many corporations have also participated in voluntary, industry-wide
human rights and ethical standards and codes, promulgated by private
actors, governments, and other institutions.26'
Multilateral institutions have also promulgated codes of conduct
defining and regulating the human rights obligations of transnational
corporations.262 The Global Compact, for example, is a U.N. initiative
consisting of nine principles in three areas of international agreement:
human rights, labor standards, and the environment.263 United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has vigorously advocated for
businesses to "embrace and enact" the nine principles.2t 4 Specifically,
the two human rights principles in the Global Compact are that
businesses should "support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of
influence" and "make sure that they are not complicit in human rights
abuses.
265
The International Labour Organization's declaration for
multinational corporations ("ILO Declaration") recommends that
governments and multinational corporations operating in member
states observe a set of principles, relating mostly to employment
practices.266 It calls on transnational corporations to "take fully into
account established general policy objectives of the [host]
countries '267 and to affirmatively harmonize their activities with their
corporate acceptance and enforcement of human rights obligations, see Douglass
Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 1963, 1964 (1996), they also have been criticized for being generally unenforced
and ineffective because of their voluntary nature, see, e.g., Lucinda Saunders, Note,
Rich and Rare Are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading
Conflict Diamonds, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1402, 1436-37 (2001).
261. See, e.g., Amnesty International Principles, supra note 216; see also Saunders,
supra note 260, at 1468-70 (discussing the Sullivan Principles and the MacBride
Principles, two initiatives that were directed at regulating corporate activity in specific
turbulent areas).
262. See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Revision 2000 (2000), available at
www.union-network. org/UNIsite/ In-Depth/ InternaRelations/
OECDGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; ILO, Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter ILO Declaration]; U.N.
Global Compact, http://65.214.34.30/un/gc/unweb.nsf/ content/thenine.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Global
Compact]; U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216.
263. Global Compact, supra note 262 (noting that the principles are derived from,
among other instruments, the Universal Declaration); see also William H. Meyer &
Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance,
34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 501 (2001).
264. Global Compact, supra note 262.
265. Id.
266. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, at Pmbl.
267. Id. para. 10.
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host state's social and development policies.268 The ILO Declaration
further asserts that multinational corporations should "respect the
sovereign rights of States, obey the national laws and regulations, give
due consideration to local practices and respect relevant international
standards." '269 Specifically, the ILO Declaration calls on transnational
corporations to respect the International Bill of Rights.2 71
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development's
guidelines for multinational corporations ("OECD Guidelines") is a
"multilaterally endorsed and comprehensive code" addressed to
business that articulates the "shared values" of the developed states
from which most multinational corporations originate.Y First
promulgated by the OECD in 1977, the code is periodically updated;
the last update was in 2000.272 The Guidelines specify a minimum set
of obligations that multinationals should strive to achieve on a range
of rights, including labor rights and environmental rights.2 3 There is
general agreement that, of all the "soft law" standards for
multinational corporations, the OECD Guidelines have the most
potential for effective implementation.274
The newly revised OECD Guidelines now obligate corporations to
"[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities
consistent with the host government's international obligations and
commitments." 275  The OECD Guidelines also specify that
multinational corporations should "take fully into account established
policies in the countries in which they operate" and, specifically,
ensure that their activities are consistent with their host country's
technology policies. 276  Additionally, the OECD Guidelines exhort
corporations to contribute to economic and social progress, and
specify the affirmative obligations of multinational corporations in the
268. Id.
269. Id. para. 8.
270. Id.
271. OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, at 5 (Statement by the Chair of the
Ministerial). The Guidelines include specific chapters on disclosure, employment, the
environment, bribery, and consumer interests, as well as on science and technology.
See id., supra note 262; see also Marinus Sikkel, A Reinvigorated Instrument for
Global Investment, OECD Observer 29, Mar. 1, 2001, 2001 WL 22296403 (describing
the guidelines as "compris[ing] recommendations, to multinational corporations, from
thirty-three governments covering areas from respect of human rights to
environmental protection wherever companies operate").
272. OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, at 5 (Statement by the Chair of the
Ministerial); see also Sikkel, supra note 271.
273. See Sikkel, supra note 271. See generally OECD Guidelines, supra note 262.
274. For a description of the implementation of the OECD Guidelines, see The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 5 OECD Working Papers 21 (1997).
Other scholars are skeptical about the guidelines' effectiveness. See, e.g., Cassel, supra
note 260, at 1970 (stating that OECD guidelines are "limited" and "[broke] little
new ground").
275. OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, at 11.2.
276. Id. at II, VIII.1
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area of science and technology.277 Thus, they suggest that when
practicable or appropriate, multinational corporations should
"contribute to the development of local and national innovative
capacity '278 and "[a]dopt... practices that permit the transfer and
rapid diffusion of technologies and know-how, with due regard to the
protection of intellectual property rights. ' 279 The commentary to the
OECD Guidelines further specifies that "[w]hen selling or licensing
technologies.., the terms and conditions negotiated [should] be
reasonable. 28 °
Finally, the draft U.N. code of conduct for transnational
corporations ("U.N. Draft Code") is an ongoing U.N. effort to define
the human rights obligations of transnational corporations.28  The
most recent version of the U.N. Draft Code asserts that "within their
respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to
respect, ensure respect for, prevent abuses of, and promote human
rights recognized in international as well as national law. ' 282 The U.N.
Draft Code further calls on transnational corporations to respect and
"contribute to [the] realization" of human rights, including the right to
health, and to "refrain from actions which obstruct the realization of
those rights. '283  The U.N. Draft Code calls on multinational
corporations to respect state sovereignty, including "applicable norms
of international law; national laws;... [and] social, economic, and
cultural policies. 28
4
Scholars debate the usefulness and effectiveness of the multilateral
codes.285 While these multilateral codes are voluntary, as one scholar
asserts, "transnational codes with a moral dimension.., are
embodiments of law in the broadest sense, because they are
enforceable by a source of control., 286  These codes may be
characterized as "soft law" instruments, which, in contrast to legally
binding and judicially enforceable instruments such as the human
rights treaties, are not mandatory and are not enforced by judicial
mechanisms.287
277. Id. at 11.1, VIII.1.
278. Id. at VI11.1
279. Id. at VIII.2.
280. OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, at Commentary, para. 54.
281. U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216. For a complete discussion of the history and
content of the U.N. Draft Code, see Dell, supra note 198, at 73-90.
282. U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216, art. A.1.
283. Id. art. E.12.
284. Id. art. E.10.
285. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in
International Markets: Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global
Communities, 15 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 327, 341, 342 (1994) (criticizing the codes as
vague and "so general as to provide little practical or useful guidance").
286. Id. at 332-33 (citations omitted).
287. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
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III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF DRUG CORPORATIONS: A
THEORY OF LIABILITY
Today, while there is considerable debate about the scope of their
obligations, it is virtually universally recognized that multinational
corporations, including the major pharmaceutical companies, do
indeed have obligations to respect human rights.28 Substantial
evidence documents the role of patents in rendering HIV/AIDS
treatment unaffordable to citizens of developing countries, as well as
the success of generic competition and parallel importing at
broadening access to those life-saving treatments."9 Drug companies,
however, have aggressively opposed the use of compulsory licensing
and parallel importing for HIV/AIDS drugs, and successfully lobbied
and pressured the U.S. government to sanction countries that seek to
promote more affordable HIV/AIDS drugs.29" These actions violate
the human rights of HIV/AIDS patients in developing countries,
which drug companies have an obligation to respect under the "soft
law" multilateral codes of conduct. 9'
A. Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs Is a Human Right
The right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment is a fundamental
human right under international law, and states have an obligation to
respect, protect, and fulfill that right.292 Several recent developments
in international law reflect an emerging consensus that access to
HIV/AIDS treatment is a human right.293 United Nations bodies have
Legal Responsibility, 11 Yale L.J. 443, 486-87 (2001) (characterizing the ILO
Declaration and the OECD Guidelines as "soft law instruments" recognizing
corporate duties). For a thoughtful discussion and analysis of "soft law," see Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 420 (1991).
288. See, e.g., Kinley, supra note 212, at 40 ("The horizontal application of human
rights law-or the 'privatisation' of human rights-is now well recognised, if not yet
having reached its full potential."); Cassel, supra note 260, at 1980-84 (analyzing codes
of conduct for transnational corporations and suggesting continuum of human rights
responsibilities of corporations); Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations
and Developing Public International Law, 1983 Duke L.J. 748, 748 (asserting that
"one of the most significant developments in public international law is the apparent
creation of law applicable to transnational corporations").
289. See, e.g., Sources & Prices, supra note 3, at 5; Untangling the Web, supra note
29, at 3 ("Generic competition appears currently to be the most efficient way to lower
the price of ARVs").
290. See supra notes 170-73,187-90 and accompanying text.
291. See infra notes 292-375 and accompanying text.
292. See Csete, supra note 10, at 265 (asserting that access to HIV/AIDS treatment
"has been recognized as a human right"); Nanda & Lodha, supra note 66, at 581.
293. See, e.g., U.N. Medicines Access Resolution, supra note 233; Comment 14,
supra note 229; U.N. HIV Guideline 6, supra note 235; Torres, supra note 219, at 106
(citing Cruz Bermtidez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Corte Suprema de
Justicia, Republica de Venezuela, Expediente Numero: 15.789 (1999), available at
http://www.csj.gov.ve/sentencias/SPA/spal5071999-15789.html).
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issued interpretative comments, resolutions, and a guideline declaring
affordable HIV/AIDS treatment a fundamental human right and
obligating states to ensure that right.294 While these instruments are
not legally binding per se, because the U.N. reflects the views of the
majority of the world's states, these instruments supplement the
human rights conventions. 95 Furthermore, national case law, such as
the Cruz Bermtdez case in Venezuela, has also interpreted the right
to HIV/AIDS treatment to be an internationally protected right and
has obligated the state to ensure that right.29 6 Cumulatively, these
developments are evidence of an emerging consensus in the
international community that all persons have the right to affordable
HIV/AIDS drugs and that states have an affirmative obligation to
ensure that right.297
In addition, the right to affordable life-saving drugs is linked closely
to various fundamental rights guaranteed under international law,
such as the rights to life, development, and to share in scientific
progress. 29' Numerous scientific studies have proven that HIV/AIDS
drugs are capable of prolonging the life of HIV-positive people. 99
Thus, denying or withholding these life-prolonging HIV/AIDS drugs
from people effectively violates their right to life.3"' Since the right to
life is guaranteed in the key human rights instruments, states have a
basic obligation under international law to guarantee the right to life
for all people by ensuring equitable access to life-saving HIV/AIDS
drug treatment. 31  Therefore, laws such as the Medicines Act
Amendment, which seek to bring HIV/AIDS drugs to those who
cannot afford them, are consistent with a state's international
obligation to protect the right to life.302
Additionally, in its Development Declaration, the U.N. further
obligates states to ensure equal opportunity to all people in the
effective availability of health services .303 As such, equitable access to
294. See U.N. Medicines Access Resolution, supra note 233; Comment 14, supra
note 229; U.N. HIV Guideline 6, supra note 235.
295. See Eide, supra note 200, at 21.
296. See Torres, supra note 219, at 106 (citing Cruz Bermiidez v. Ministerio de
Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Republica de Venezuela,
Expediente Numero: 15.789 (1999), available at http://www.csj.gov.ve/
sentencias/SPA/spal507l999-15789. html).
297. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text (discussing the recent
developments suggesting that access to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment is a human
right).
298. See supra notes 242-58 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Call for Action, supra note 14.
301. See ICCPR, supra note 201, art. 6(1); Universal Declaration, supra note 201,
art. 3; see also supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text (discussing the right to life
under international law).
302. See Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, § 10; supra notes 243-47 and
accompanying text.
303. See Development Declaration, supra note 248, art. 8(1).
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the "health service" of HIV/AIDS drugs is a component of the right
to development guaranteed under international law.30 4 Furthermore,
equitable access to scientific advancements, in the form of new
HIV/AIDS drugs, is also encompassed within the internationally
guaranteed right to share in the benefits of scientific progress.3 °5 Thus,
equitable access to HIV/AIDS drugs is not only an emerging
independent human right, but is already encompassed within a bundle
of other human rights guaranteed under international law.306
B. Corporate Accountability Under "Soft Law": Multilateral Codes of
Conduct
The "soft law" multilateral codes of conduct for transnational
corporations are an important source of human rights obligations for
corporations, including drug companies. 37 The body of international
human rights law includes a broad range of sources of norms and
obligations, beyond just treaties, including "soft law."3 8  Because
these norms were developed and promulgated by multilateral
institutions composed of many of the world's states, they reflect a
broad international consensus on the human rights obligations of
corporations.3 9 Thus, the cumulative effect of these "soft law"
standards is to embody a set of international norms to govern the
actions of corporations which impact the social sphere.310  In
particular, those obligations that are consistently defined throughout
the several multilateral standards indicate a powerful consensus on
the minimum human rights obligations of transnational
corporations.3 ' While differing in their specific content, the
multilateral codes of conduct and standards overlap in their definition
of several general human rights norms for transnational
corporations.1 2
The fact that the "soft law" standards lack formal judicial
mechanisms under which to prosecute the drug corporations for their
human rights violations does not make the drug companies'
304. See Ricketson, supra note 191, at 209; supra notes 248-53 and accompanying
text (discussing the right to development under international law).
305. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing the right to share in
the benefits of scientific progress).
306. See Csete, supra note 10, at 266-71 (discussing the connections between access
to HIV/AIDS treatment and other human rights).
307. See Ratner, supra note 287, at 486-87; supra notes 262-87 and accompanying
text (discussing the multilateral codes).
308. See generally Dupuy, supra note 287, for a discussion of "soft law."
309. See Ratner, supra note 287, at 486-87.
310. See id. (asserting that soft law instruments recognizing corporate duties reflect
the expectations of states and discussing the ILO Declaration and the OECD
Guidelines).
311. See supra notes 262-87 and accompanying text (detailing the human rights
duties of corporations under the multilaterally endorsed codes of conduct).
312. See infra notes 316-19, 346-50 and accompanying text.
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obligations any less compelling.313 In fact, public pressure has proven
effective in forcing drug companies to stop challenging countries
trying to make HIV/AIDS drugs cheaper and to lower their drug
prices. 314 As such, continuing public pressure has a potential key role
to play in enforcing the norms recommended in the multilateral codes
of conduct.315
1. The "Soft Law" Corporate Obligation to Respect Host State's
Sovereignty, Laws, and Policies
Both the U.N. Draft Code and the ILO Declaration specifically
urge transnational corporations to respect the sovereignty and laws of
their host countries.316 Several of the standards, such as the OECD
Guidelines, U.N. Draft Code and ILO Declaration, also impose a duty
on transnational corporations to respect the social policies of their
host countries.317 Furthermore, the ILO Declaration adds that
corporations have an affirmative duty to take into consideration their
host countries' policies, and to harmonize their operations with those
countries' social and development goals.318 Thus, "soft law" imposes a
minimum obligation on drug corporations operating in developing
countries to respect their host countries' sovereignty, policies, and
laws. 319  South Africa and other developing countries with severe
HIV/AIDS epidemics have exercised their sovereignty to establish
national public health policies to promote affordable HIV/AIDS
medicines.31  Developing countries have further exercised their
sovereignty to enact laws, such as the Medicines Act Amendment, to
implement these HIV/AIDS drugs policies.3 1  Thus, drug companies
violate their obligations under the "soft law" standards when they
fight laws such as the Medicines Act Amendment, through litigation;
lobbying of the U.S. government; threats to move their operations out
of the offending country; and other exertions of the drug industry's
substantial political and economic power to prevent developing
countries from implementing those laws.322
313. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
314. See UNAIDS Update, supra note 1, at 9 (identifying public pressure as one
factor contributing to decreasing drug prices); see also sources cited supra note 181.
315. See sources cited supra note 181.
316. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 8; U.N. Draft Code, supra note
216, art. E.10.
317. See U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216, art. E.10; OECD Declaration, supra
note 262, at II; ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 10.
318. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 10.
319. See OECD Declaration, supra note 262, at II; ILO Declaration, supra note
262, paras. 8, 10; U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216, art. E.10.
320. See, e.g., National Drug Policy for South Africa, supra note 125.
321. See Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10.
322. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 for a detailed description of the drug
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Some may argue that advocating that multinational corporations
respect state sovereignty, policies, and laws poses a dilemma in the
case of companies operating in repressive regimes that permit or
encourage human rights abuses.323 However, the norms in these
multilateral standards logically must be read to incorporate
international human rights law.324 It is implicit that, as efforts to
encourage socially responsible corporate activity in the human rights
sphere, the standards for corporate conduct do not stand for the
proposition that corporations obey laws that violate international
human rights.325
In fact, as discussed below, the standards also impose simultaneous
obligations on corporations to respect the human rights obligations of
countries and to themselves respect and support international human
rights.32 6 Reading these multiple obligations together, therefore,
suggests that corporations have a duty to respect those national laws
and policies which are consistent with human rights standards.327
Either way, in the case at hand, because the Medicines Act
Amendment and similar legislation are efforts to actively promote
important human rights, drug companies cannot avail themselves of
this argument.32
To the contrary, in light of the staggering magnitude of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing nations, state policies and laws
that seek to make life-saving drugs available to those dying of
HIV/AIDS reflect particularly legitimate and weighty goals worthy of
the respect and cooperation of the drug corporations.32' Furthermore,
since the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment is a human right
that states are obligated to protect, laws to promote access to life-
prolonging drugs accord with international human rights law.3 The
Medicines Act Amendment and similar laws directly promote human
rights by more equitably distributing life-prolonging drugs among
companies' actions against countries that proposed laws to make HIV/AIDS drugs
more affordable.
323. For an example of corporate complicity with states in human rights violations,
see Cassel, supra note 260, at 1964-68 (discussing Royal Dutch Shell's complicity with
the Nigerian government in human rights abuses).
324. See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text for a description of the
normative framework for international human rights.
325. See, e.g., Preface to OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, para. I (asserting that
the guidelines "provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business
conduct consistent with applicable laws" (emphasis added)).
326. See infra notes 346-51 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 218-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant
human rights standards for drug companies.
328. See supra notes 124-26 (describing the context of the Medicines Act
Amendment, supra note 10).
329. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 292-306 and accompanying text (arguing that access to
HIV/AIDS drugs is a human right).
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HIV-positive people.331
Even accepting that this corporate duty only extends to those laws
that are consistent with international law, some may argue that drug
companies do not have any obligation to respect laws to increase
access to HIV/AIDS drugs because such laws violate developing
countries' international obligations under TRIPS.332 While the drug
industry and its supporters continue to oppose laws such as South
Africa's Medicines Act Amendment, the consensus is that the
Medicines Act Amendment is valid under TRIPS.333 Additionally, in
the recent Doha Declaration, the WTO interpreted TRIPS to allow
developing countries to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable,
including through the use of compulsory licensing and parallel
importing.334 As a WTO ministerial pronouncement, the Doha
Declaration is a "persuasive authority" that asserts that TRIPS does
indeed allow such practices, which laws like the Medicines Act
Amendment seek to introduce in order to make HIV/AIDS drugs
more broadly accessible.335
Furthermore, the drug industry's interpretation of those laws is
based on a TRIPS-plus approach, which seeks to force developing
countries to offer their products greater patent protection than TRIPS
requires.336 The WTO member states, however, signed on to the
standards in TRIPS, not the TRIPS-plus obligations that the drug
industry seeks to impose.337 Drug companies are not obligated to
respect laws that violate TRIPS, but the drug industry has failed to
prove that laws like the Medicines Act Amendment violate TRIPS.338
As such, there is little merit to the argument that drug companies do
not have an obligation to respect laws like South Africa's Medicines
Act Amendment because they violate TRIPS.339
Additionally, there is some suggestion in the multilateral codes of
conduct that corporations have an affirmative obligation to cooperate
with their host states.3 40  The ILO Declaration specifically
recommends that corporations affirmatively harmonize their activities
with their host states' social and development policies.3 41 The drug
companies' multi-faceted attack on laws such as the Medicines Act
331. See Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, § 10.
332. See supra notes 94-122 and accompanying text for a presentation of the
TRIPS provisions relevant to access to HIV/AIDS medicines and the debate over
their interpretation.
333. See sources cited supra note 156.
334. See Doha Declaration, supra note 117; see also supra notes 117-20 and
accompanying text.
335. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 101, 112-13 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
338. See sources cited supra note 156 and accompanying text.
339. See sources cited supra note 156 and accompanying text.
340. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 10.
341. Id.
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Amendment is inconsistent with this obligation to cooperate with, and
conform their activities to, state efforts to make HIV/AIDS drugs
affordable,342
Moreover, the drug companies may also violate their obligation to
respect and cooperate with state policies to promote the right to
medical treatment when they charge prices so high that only one-tenth
of one percent of worldwide HIV/AIDS sufferers can buy their
drugs.34 3 The consistently high prices drug companies charge directly
conflict with the shared goal of many developing states to ensure
treatment to those dying of HIV/AIDS.3" As such, the prices drug
corporations charge for their patented drugs in the developing world
may not only be unreasonable and unethical, but also a violation of
their obligations under the multilateral codes of conduct not to
interfere with the legitimate policies of host governments.345
2. The "Soft Law" Corporate Obligation to Respect and Support the
Protection of Human Rights
There is a broad consensus in the multilateral corporate standards
that corporations have an additional duty to both respect and support
the international obligations of their host countries to protect human
rights.346 For example, the U.N. Draft Code calls on corporations to
"respect, ensure respect for, prevent abuses of, and promote human
rights;" '347 the Global Compact urges corporations to both support and
respect the protection of human rights;348 the ILO Declaration
recommends that corporations respect "relevant international
standards," specifying the International Bill of Rights;349 and the
newly revised OECD Guidelines now also obligate corporations to
respect the human rights of those people affected by the corporation's
activities." The U.N. Draft Code further suggests that corporations
may also have an independent duty themselves to respect, support,
and promote human rights.35
342. See supra notes 170-73, 187-89 (describing drug companies' opposition to laws
seeking to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable).
343. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 124-25 (describing South Africa's constitutional obligations to
ensure the right to health and its national drug policy to ensure that right).
345. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 10.
346. See, e.g., ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 8; Global Compact, supra
note 262; U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216, art. A.1.
347. U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216, art. A.1.
348. Global Compact, supra note 262. The right to HIV/AIDS treatment should be
understood as within the "sphere of influence" of pharmaceutical corporations, who
have the power to set the prices they charge for their drugs and to either support or
challenge states' efforts to protect the right to health of their citizens by making drugs
affordable.
349. See ILO Declaration, supra note 262, para. 8.
350. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 262, at 11.2.
351. See U.N. Draft Code, supra note 216.
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As argued in Part II.A, all states have a legal obligation to respect
and promote the right to affordable medical treatment, which is linked
to the rights to life, health, sharing in the benefits of scientific
progress, and development; the lack of affordable HIV/AIDS drugs
impinges on all of these rights." 2 The drug companies violate their
"soft law" obligations to respect and support states' human rights
obligations when they obstruct the efforts of developing countries to
promote and fulfill the human rights to health, life, medical treatment,
development, and an equitable distribution of the benefits of scientific
progress.353
In practice, the actions of the drug companies have resulted in the
direct loss of millions of lives that could have been saved through the
availability of generic drugs.354 South Africa's law explicitly sought to
make HIV/AIDS drugs more widely available through generic
competition."' If South Africa had proceeded with the
implementation of its law as planned, a great number of HIV-positive
South Africans would have been able to buy HIV/AIDS drugs that
they could not have otherwise afforded.356 By bringing a lawsuit that
delayed the implementation of South Africa's provisions for more
affordable medicines, the drug industry effectively prevented those
people from gaining access to treatment that would have significantly
enhanced and prolonged their lives.357
Furthermore, the industry has consistently misused its considerable
influence to cause the United States to pressure countries such as
South Africa to forego generic competition, often resulting in the U.S.
government sanctioning those countries. 8 Although many countries
have promulgated laws promoting generic competition, countries have
been hesitant to implement those laws because they fear retaliation by
the U.S. government at the behest of the major drug companies. 9
Thus, millions of people in the developing world continue to perish,
even though studies confirm that the availability of generic
HIV/AIDS drugs could save lives.36 Although other factors, such as
the lack of health infrastructure in developing countries, admittedly
play a role in determining the effective access to drugs, it is absurd to
352. See supra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 170-73, 187-88 (describing drug companies' actions to interfere
with states' efforts to promote access to HIV/AIDS drugs).
354. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing success of HIV/AIDS
drugs at prolonging life).
355. See Medicines Act Amendment, supra note 10, § 10.
356. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
357. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 for a detailed account of the drug industry's
lawsuit against South Africa.
358. See Sell, supra note 12, at 495.
359. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (describing developing countries'
fear of enacting laws allowing compulsory licensing).
360. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
1177
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
suggest that patents are not to blame for the lack of access to drugs.36'
As such, the pharmaceutical industry's aggressive lobbying of the U.S.
government, to take action against countries which enact measures
that limit drug patent rights in order to save lives, violates the
emerging human right to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs.362
The drug companies' rights to intellectual property, and thus the
right to charge the prices they choose, are appropriately limited to
those rights that are consistent with internationally recognized human
rights.363 As the World Health Assembly, a multilateral institution
representative of the international community, has asserted, the right
to health should be paramount to intellectual property rights.3" Thus,
the multilateral standards effectively call on drug companies to
interpret their intellectual property rights under TRIPS in a manner
that is consistent with human rights.365 The Doha Declaration
confirmed that TRIPS can and should be interpreted consistently with
human rights.366 Particularly in light of the Doha Declaration, drug
companies should interpret TRIPS consistently with their human
rights obligations.367
Just as TRIPS imposes obligations on states to offer the specified
patent protection, international law imposes an even more critical
obligation on states: the duty to fulfill the rights of their populations to
life-saving medical care.368 These two obligations should be read
consistently with each other, and not as mutually exclusive.369 The
purpose of TRIPS could not be to subordinate the human rights
obligations of states to their trade imperatives, particularly given the
vast array of public interest exceptions that TRIPS affords WTO
member states.370
Human rights activists have criticized the pharmaceutical industry
for trying to have it both ways, i.e., benefiting from the strong patent
protection provisions of TRIPS, while challenging countries that seek
to take legal advantage of other TRIPS provisions, namely
compulsory licensing and parallel importing.3 71 Large corporations
are the major beneficiaries of the strong protectionist regime for
361. See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the debate
over whether patents are responsible for impeding access to HIV/AIDS drugs.
362. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (describing negative
consequences that drug company lobbying of U.S. government had for South Africa).
363. See supra notes 21.8-57 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
365. See Cohn, supra note 14, at 435-37; Call for Action, supra note 14; see also
supra notes 218-57 (defining the human rights at stake).
366, Doha Declaration, supra note 117.
367. Id.
368. See supra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
369. Human rights and intellectual property rights should be understood as
complementary rights.
* 370. See sources cited supra note 94.
371. See, e.g., Call for Action, supra note 14.
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intellectual property embodied in TRIPS.372 The strong patent
protection that developing nations must provide drug companies
under TRIPS carries high social and economic costs to the state and
its citizens.7 The quid pro quo for the strong patent protection
afforded pharmaceutical corporations by WTO member states is, at
the minimum, respect for state policies consistent with TRIPS.374
Thus, pharmaceutical companies violate their obligations under the
"soft law" standards when they challenge states that invoke the
explicit TRIPS provisions that allow states to address health crises
such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.375
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property rights are important to the research and
development of HIV/AIDS drugs, and deserve protection. But
intellectual property rights do not, and should not, trump human
rights. Through its various public interest exceptions to patent
protection, TRIPS makes clear that, under certain circumstances, it is
legal and appropriate to limit intellectual property rights to achieve
broader societal goals. Given the magnitude of the AIDS pandemic
in developing countries and the widespread lack of financial access to
HIV/AIDS drugs in those countries, laws like the Medicines Act
Amendment are an appropriate limitation on intellectual property
rights.
International human rights law is catching up with the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, and is increasingly acknowledging the human rights of
HIV/AIDS patients, including the right to affordable HIV/AIDS
treatment. Developing countries have an obligation under
international law to provide their citizens with affordable HIV/AIDS
drugs, and drug companies have a "soft law" obligation under the
multilateral corporate codes of conduct to respect developing states'
efforts to protect the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment.
372. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing South Africa's drug
policy).
375. See generally Part I.B for a description of the ways in which drug companies
impeded South Africa and other countries from making HIV/AIDS drugs more
affordable.
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